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The five papers that comprise this dissertation illustrate the complexity of 
interdisciplinary work as well as the advantages of the culture and cognition approach.  
Chapters II to IV use cross-cultural evidence to argue that the understanding of 
psychological processes such as the ontogenesis of belief attribution and categorization 
can be enriched by adopting this perspective. The two papers on belief attribution among 
Yukatek children show that this capacity emerges around age 6 (only slightly later than in 
other cultures); that children differentiate between the minds of humans and God from 
early on; and that children who perform well on human false-belief tests are able use their 
knowledge of differences between kinds of agents – human, animal, and non-natural – to 
make inferences about what they can know. 
Chapter IV argues that historical processes can shape the structure of familial and 
extra-familial social relations, which, in turn, are thought to affect the performance of 
 x
northern and southern Italians on a simple categorization task. Southern Italians as a 
group paired more items thematically than did northern Italians; among Southerners, low-
SES participants also showed a preference for thematic over taxonomic grouping.  
Chapters V and VI complement the previous ones by showing that 
anthropologists have sometimes made mistaken or incomplete claims about the 
psychological processes that they inferred from their observations. Chapter V revisits the 
topic of the attribution of knowledge, this time from the perspective of the professional 
anthropologist, and is meant as a warning against the unreflective application of our 
innate tendency to attribute knowledge to others when thinking scientifically. 
Chapter VI argues that three organizational features of culture observed by 
anthropologists – its systematicity; the recurrence of distinctions across semantic, 
conceptual, and practical boundaries; and the ‘bleeding’ of properties between associated 
concepts – may find their origin in fundamental operating principles of the mind – 
respectively, the cognitive principle of relevance, the decompositionality of cognitive 
processing, and the network structure of semantic memory. This reframing of some 
features of culture in cognitive terms opens up some ethnographic observations to new 




Introduction: The Study of Culture and Cognition 
 
We are currently seeing an increase in collaborative work involving psychologists and 
anthropologists. While this is undoubtedly resulting in an increase in knowledge, it is 
worth thinking about the costs involved. The challenges of interdisciplinary research are 
rarely the same for each of the disciplines involved; in this case, I believe that 
psychologists are somewhat at an advantage over their anthropological colleagues. The 
reasons for this are found in the history of the two disciplines. 
 
A broadly-conceived interest in matters of psychology was once very much a part 
of the anthropological mainstream. From the very earliest anthropological reports, a great 
deal of discussion has focused on the positing and illustration of cross-cultural variability 
of mental processes and products. The work of E. B. Tylor and James G. Frazer is an 
early example of this interest, and that of such eminent anthropologists as Ruth Benedict, 
Margaret Mead, Bronisław Malinowski, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Claude Lévi-Strauss can 
be said to deal at least partially with matters of psychology. Of course, these 
anthropologists were not for the most part acquainted with modern psychological theory, 
nor could they be. Thus contemporary psychologists may not recognize their methods 
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and theoretical orientations as psychological. Nonetheless, it is clear that these authors 
were writing about the mind.1  
 
 In comparison to the history of anthropology, that of psychology appears more 
linear. Having grown out of philosophy, it soon embraced a naturalistic epistemological 
orientation, thereby differentiating itself from other branches of the study of the mind, 
such as psychoanalysis. Most psychologists eagerly adopted the methodological tools 
being developed by statisticians. Today, the field of psychology is broad enough to 
accommodate such disparate topics as psychophysics and social biases. It can do so, and 
still appear unified from the outside, because the great majority of psychologists share a 
number of beliefs; that the mind is a processor, that it is a natural object, and therefore 
that it should be studied with naturalistic tools; that this study should be guided by the 
broadly Popperian principles of falsification and accumulation of confirming evidence; 
that psychological phenomena can be broken down into their constituent parts, and that 
these parts are legitimate candidates for investigation; and that the most appropriate way 
to offer evidence for one’s hypotheses is, in many cases, to gather quantitative data.  
 It was not always thus, however; before the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 
1950s most psychologists would have described themselves as behaviourists, and would 
have disputed the first point of the above list (though they would have likely agreed with 
the rest). By the 1950s, the development of the computer, a fertile source of analogies and 
ideas, helped to establish cognitive processes as the standard focus of psychological 
study.  
                                                 
1 The importance of psychological concerns to anthropology should not be over-estimated, however; many 
past and contemporary anthropologists have shown little interest in the mind and instead chosen to focus on 
social processes (e.g., kinship, alliance, warfare, etc.). 
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Stimulated by these advances, many anthropologists became interested in the 
possibilities of the cognitive model (D’Andrade, 1995). They adopted the cognitivists’ 
epistemological principles and produced very important and innovative work in the areas 
of componential analysis of kinship terminologies (Goodenough, 1956; Lounsbury, 
1956), ethnobotany (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1974; Conklin, 1954; Frake, 1980), 
colour naming (Berlin & Kay, 1969), etc.  
Although contemporary cognitive anthropologists2 differ from the ethnoscientists 
in significant respects that will be discussed later, their epistemological orientations are 
undeniably similar. They share a belief that the best way to answer a question is to 
provide evidence that supports a hypothesis and allows one to reject others; that 
quantification, repeated observation, and the manipulation of variables are useful tools in 
answering questions about cognition and culture; and that the desire to accurately portray 
other societies in their full complexity sometimes has to be subordinated to the 
limitations of hypothesis-driven experimentation.  
 The similarities between ethnoscientists and contemporary cognitive 
anthropologists are more starkly thrown into relief when are contrasted with the 
theoretical orientation of contemporary mainstream3 anthropology, strongly influenced 
by the work of Clifford Geertz (1973b) and that of a group of scholars who further 
                                                 
2 I see modern cognitive anthropology as a category subordinate to ‘culture and cognition.’ The latter also 
includes cross-cultural psychology.  
3 While I do believe that modern mainstream anthropology is largely interpretive and non-cognitive, not all 
non-cognitive anthropologists are interpretive. Many anthropologists use methods derived from the 
humanities – in particular history – and owe relatively little to the contributions of Geertz, Marcus, 
Clifford, Fischer, and colleagues.  
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developed ideas in the interpretive tradition (Clifford, 1988; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; 
Marcus & Fischer, 1986).  
An alternative view of how anthropological knowledge should advance is rather 
neatly expressed by Geertz (1973c): “A study is an advance if it is more incisive – 
whatever that may mean – than those that preceded it; but it less stands on their shoulders 
than, challenged and challenging, runs by their side” (p. 25). Leaving aside the problems 
that derive from not specifying – perhaps not knowing – what is meant by incisiveness in 
this context, it is clear that the broadly Popperian principles that I earlier noted to be 
shared by the ethnoscientists and the modern cognitive anthropologists are not seen by 
Geertz as being essential, or even necessary, to the anthropological enterprise. Theory, in 
this formulation, is not dissociable from its culture-specific application (ibid.), and is not 
predictive in the standard scientific sense (p. 26). In his essay on Balinese cockfighting 
(1973a), Geertz illustrates this approach by describing this practice as so deeply 
embedded in Balinese culture that it could not be compared to cockfighting in another 
society. This holistic view contrast sharply with that of Roy D’Andrade (1995), who sees 
the organization and limitations of the mind as making possible “a particulate theory of 
culture” (p. 247). 
 
Yet in spite of their similarities, the old and new cognitive anthropology are not 
the same. One of the most incisive critiques coming from the interpretive camp focused 
on the ethnoscientists’ lack of attention to people’s behaviour and the social context (for a 
similar critique from a cognitivist viewpoint, see Shore, 1996). In retrospect, it does 
appear that a love for order made some of their semantic taxonomies look more like ideal 
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models than accurate descriptions of mental processes and cultural products. In addition 
to being psychologically sound, current work in cognitive anthropology appears to be 
more refined anthropologically.   
Examples of this approach are the work of Rita Astuti on Vezo conceptions of 
mind/body dualism (2001; Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004) and death (Astuti & Harris, 
forthcoming); Scott Atran on Maya folk-biology (1998; 1999); Maurice Bloch and Dan 
Sperber on the mother’s brother controversy (Bloch & Sperber, 2002); Pascal Boyer on 
traditional discourse (1990); Lawrence Hirschfeld on the development of concepts of race 
(1996); and of Harvey Whitehouse on religion in Melanesia (1995; 1996). There are of 
course many more examples, but these works share what I consider the essential 
characteristics of modern cognitive anthropology: a simultaneous commitment to 
engaging psychology as accurately as our current knowledge allows, and to portraying 
culture, action, and behaviour with as much richness and depth as possible.  
 
I see this collection of papers as illustrating the complexity of interdisciplinary 
work as well as the advantages of the culture and cognition approach. Chapters II to IV 
use evidence from Yucatán and Italy to argue that our understanding of basic 
psychological processes such as the ontogenesis of belief attribution and categorization 
can be enriched by adopting a cross-cultural perspective. The impact of culture and class 
on these processes is illustrated and discussed. Chapters V and VI complement the 
previous ones by showing that anthropologists have sometimes made mistaken or 
incomplete claims about the psychological processes that they inferred from their 
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observation of cultures. I argue that an awareness of psychological methods and findings 
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Humans routinely attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires in order to interpret the 
behaviour of others. Other humans are seen as agents, that is, as entities that pursue goals 
in accordance with their beliefs and desires. Attributions of agency are so ubiquitous that 
they are typically taken for granted in everyday life. These attributions are not always 
correct in identifying the beliefs and desires that underlie a specific action of an agent; 
yet, if people did not see others as agents, the capacity to understand their behaviour 
would be severely impaired (for example, people would be surprised when others got up 
and moved).  
 
Abundant research documents children’s acquisition of human agent concepts 
over the first several years of life (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Perner, 1993; 
Wellman, 1990), but there is little work available on the development of non-human 
agent concepts. Yet, people often attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires to animals as 
well as to ghosts, gods, demons, and monsters. Scholars have long assumed that children 
first acquire concepts of human agency and then use them as templates to understand all 
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nonhuman agents. One exception in this regard is found in the work of Barrett and 
collaborators (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001; Richert & Barrett, 1999). 
 
In this article, we offer further support for Barrett’s point of view, showing that 
Yukatek children do not reason in the same way about the agency of humans and God 
since early on in development. In the first part, we discuss the development of human 
agent concepts, specifically with regard to the false-belief task. Then, we outline the 
predictions implied by several theoretical positions concerning the development of 
children’s understanding of humans’ and God’s beliefs. After that, we present 
experimental evidence from a Yukatek Maya sample that supports the hypothesis that 
young children do not reason about God’s beliefs in human terms. Finally, we discuss the 
theoretical positions and their predictions in light of the results and place the evidence in 
the larger context of theory of mind research. 
 
The Development of Human Agent Concepts 
The cognitive literature on child development usually distinguishes three phases in the 
development of understanding of agency (see for example Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koos, & 
Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; 
Wellman & Wooley, 1990). During the first year or so, children are believed to apply a 
principle of rational action – that is, they begin to appreciate that humans do not merely 
propel themselves, but do so in purposeful and rational ways. By the second or third year, 
children incorporate simple mentalistic attributions into this rational principle: the 
purposeful and rational action is understood to be driven by desires. Finally, during the 
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fourth or fifth year, the principle of rational action is coupled with representational 
attributions: agents are seen as pursuing goals in accordance to their beliefs.  
The emergence of this representational stage, which is a necessary condition for 
the possession of a full-fledged conception of the mind, is the most relevant to the 
arguments and experimental results presented in this article. Exactly when this transition 
takes place has been a matter of considerable debate generating an abundance of research 
(e.g., Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Carruthers & Smith, 1996; Whiten, 1991). 
Although some evidence has emerged for the presence of representational reasoning in 
3-year-olds (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Lewis & 
Osbourne, 1990; Siegal & Beattie, 1991), the bulk of the data available suggests that this 
ability is neither stable nor robust until children are five or older (Flavell, Flavell, Green, 
& Moses, 1990; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wellman 
& Wooley, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Since Premack and Woodruff (1978) started experimenting with non-human 
primates in order to establish the possibility that they had a ‘theory of mind,’ different 
ways of testing for this have been designed and tried out. As Dennett (1978) pointed out, 
you can credit an entity with a conception of belief only if there is evidence that it is able 
to understand that others may entertain false beliefs. Therefore, to probe children’s 
representational understanding of agency – whether they have a conception of belief – it 
is necessary to ascertain that they figure out that people can have false beliefs and that 
these beliefs can motivate behaviour. 
A variety of false-belief tasks have been developed in the last twenty years to test 
children’s understanding of beliefs. One such experiment is known as the ‘Sally-Ann’ 
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test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In this test, the child is made to look at a scene in which 
two dolls are animated by experimenters. The dolls are used to represent human beings – 
Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) have shown in a meta-analysis of false-belief studies 
that using a doll as a proxy for an actual human being does not affect the outcome of the 
experiment. The two dolls enter the stage; one of them (Sally) places an object in one of 
two containers and leaves the room. While Sally is out, the second doll (Ann) moves the 
object into the second container. Sally re-enters the stage; at that point, children are asked 
where Sally, who is unaware that the switch took place, will look for the object. Children, 
therefore, are asked to infer whether Sally will act according to her false belief (that the 
object is still in the original container) or not. 
Another false belief task, the one used in the experiments that will be presented 
later, is known as the ‘surprising contents’ task. In it, children are shown a closed 
container (usually a cracker box with a conspicuous picture of its contents on the outside) 
and asked what they believe is in it. The experimenter then opens the box to reveal that 
the crackers have been removed, and that small rocks (or a similarly unexpected item) 
have been put in their place. After closing the box again, the experimenter checks that the 
children still understand and remember what the box contains. The experimenter then 
introduces a doll who has not seen the inside of the box, and asks what the doll would 
think is in the container. Again, the point of the experiment is to establish whether 




The Development of God Concepts 
By and large the research pertaining to children’s understanding of agent concepts deals 
exclusively with human agent concepts: how children’s concepts of human agency 
become increasingly specialized. In false-belief tasks, as well as in most other studies of 
children’s understanding of agency, experimenters have asked children to reason about 
human actions, beliefs, desires, and emotions. Very little available research addresses the 
generalizability of children’s understanding of agency to non-human agents in general, 
and to God in particular. However, by looking at the assumptions of several theoretical 
positions, we can envisage their predictions concerning the understanding of God in 
comparison to humans in a false-belief task. 
In Figure 2.1 we offer a tree diagram to show how these positions are related to 
each other. The graphs outline predictions of false-belief task performance in relation to 
humans and God. To illustrate the graphs, consider a surprising contents task: suppose 
children are presented with a closed cracker box, shown that the box contains small 
rocks, and then asked what a human and God, who did not have a chance to look inside 




Figure 2.1. Predictions of false-belief task performance 
 
In all graphs, the top line represents attribution of beliefs to humans, and the bottom line 
represents attribution of belief to God. On the Y axis, performance is mapped; the higher 
the line, the more likely it is that a child would attribute false beliefs to the agent in 
question – to say that a human or God would think that the box contains crackers. The X 
axis shows the developmental time frame. As indicated by the dotted lines, the age range 
3  4          7 
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of 4 to 7 is the most relevant to our discussion, since it is then that children, according to 
the current literature, come to attribute false beliefs to human agents (see discussion in 
the previous section).    
At the highest level of the tree, the opposition is between similarity and non-
similarity perspectives with regard to the way beliefs are attributed to God and humans.  
From a non-similarity perspective, children would start to differentiate humans and God 
(attributing more false beliefs to humans than to God) from the very beginning of the 
developmental stage of our concern. From a similarity perspective, children would 
attribute either true beliefs or false beliefs to both humans and God in equal measure, 
initially, and for at least some part of this developmental time frame. 
Similarity positions (graphs 1 through 4) postulate that children initially use 
humans (or some humans) as an analogical basis to understand God’s beliefs. At the very 
least, we can distinguish two stances: a strong and a weak one. The strong stance is 
perhaps best represented in Piaget’s work (1960). There are two possible interpretations 
of Piaget’s understanding of the development of God concepts. In graph 1, an infallible 
parent (who is capable of knowing what is inside the box without having to see it) is used 
as the basis to understand God until quite late in development. At some point, children 
start to recognize that parents can entertain false beliefs but they do not transfer this 
characteristic to God, since at this point they also start to learn that God has special 
qualities such as omniscience. For example, children would initially say that both agents 
believe that rocks are inside the box, then, only by age 7, they would start to say that 
humans believe that crackers are inside the box, and God believe that rocks are inside. 
Conversely, in graph 2, a normal human being is used as the basis to understand God 
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until quite late in development. Then, children start to learn that God possesses certain 
special characteristics that set God aside from common humans. 
The weak stance postulates that children initially use humans as a basis to 
understand God’s beliefs but start to differentiate them earlier in development than Piaget 
postulated – before reaching the age of seven. In other words, we are envisaging the 
possibility of Piaget being wrong simply in terms of the onset of the differentiation. In 
graph 3, an infallible human is used as a basis to understand God. In graph 4, a normal 
human is instead used as the basis. This explains why both the human and the God line 
stay flat for some time in the first instance, and climb initially in the second. Although 
these positions are not well established in the literature, they are possibilities that one 
should consider when dealing with cross-cultural data. For example, graph 4 can be seen 
as a plausible representation of people living in a society where the concept of God as 
omniscient is not very widespread.  
Finally, moving on to the last graph in Figure 2.1, a non-similarity perspective 
would predict that children being tested on the false-belief task would start differentiating 
between humans and God very early in development. This is the position that Justin 
Barrett and collaborators have been advocating (Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, Richert, & 
Driesenga, 2001).  Their main idea is that young children do not need to conceptualize 
human agency first and then use it as a basis to understand supernatural agency; rather 
young children have already the potential to think independently about different types of 
agents and reason accordingly. In graph 5, the God line remains close to floor level, 
which signifies that children from an early age attribute mostly true beliefs to God – i.e., 
that God knows that there are rocks in the box. The human line, on the other hand, starts 
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at the same level as the God line but then by the age of 4 steeply climbs – children 
increasingly say that humans believe that the box contains crackers, as their capacity to 
attribute false beliefs improves.  
Experimental data from the United States supports the prediction of this non-
similarity position (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001). In figure 2.2, the results of a 
surprising contents experiment run with a sample of American children recruited from 
Reformed and Lutheran Protestant churches are presented. Children in the US sample can 
be seen to treat humans and God in the same way up to age 4. By age 5, they already 
sharply differentiate between the two agents. The divergence between God and the 
mother took place as children started to attribute false beliefs to the latter. A Wilcoxon 
Signed-Ranks Test for matched pairs comparing “crackers” responses between mother 
and God at each specific age detected significant differences only for 5- and 6-year-olds 

































Figure 2.2. False-belief task – US children 
 
However, there is no available cross-cultural evidence that addresses this question.  In the 
next section, we present data on a similar false-belief task run with a sample of Yukatek 
Maya children, in order to provide a test of these theoretical predictions.  
 
Sample composition 
The Maya sample consisted of 48 children divided in four age groups: eleven 4-year-olds 
(4,0-4,11), twelve 5-year-olds (5,0-5,11), twelve 6-year-olds (6,0-6,11), and thirteen 7-
year-olds (7,0-7,10). Twenty-six children were male, and twenty-two female. The 
experimenter piloted the protocol with some 3-year-olds, but since most of them seemed 
to have difficulty in concentrating long enough they were dropped from the sample. The 
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children resided in four small rural villages in the Quintana Roo state in the Yucatán 
peninsula (Southeastern Mexico). The overwhelming majority of people living in the 
rural interior of Quintana Roo are ethnic Maya.  
The children generally began attending preschool when they were four or five 
years old, and started primary school when they turned six. Both the preschool and the 
primary school offer bilingual education, in Spanish and Yukatek Mayan. Although many 
individuals below the age of 50 are reasonably proficient in Spanish, the favoured 
language in the domestic environment is Yukatek. For this reason, most of the children 
who enter preschool are virtually monolingual in this language.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
All children were interviewed in Yukatek by a native speaker, who has participated in 
several other studies in the region and is known to many of the participants’ families. The 
experiment consisted in a version of the “surprising contents” task. Participants were 
interviewed either in the hut of the experimenters or in their family’s hut. The agents used 
were a doll named Soledad and the Catholic God (the Maya have adopted this religious 
entity into their pantheon several centuries ago). We decided not to use the mother as 
stimulus in Yucatán as it proved impossible to interview the children while their mother 
was away. In this situation, it would not have been feasible to control for the possibility 
of the child thinking the mother had a chance to see what was inside the container. The 
researchers used a container made out of a dried squash, known in Yukatek as ho’ma, 
which keeps maize tortillas warm after cooking them. The ho’ma has a small opening 
carved out on top, just large enough to put one’s hand through. Every family visited by 
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the experimenters owned at least one and usually several of these containers. Although 
they may be occasionally used to store other objects, there was high consensus among the 
participants that the normal, appropriate content was indeed tortillas, as measured by 
control questions asked at the beginning of the experiment (“What is this container 
called?”; “what would you usually find in it?”).  
The ho’ma’s opening was closed with a piece of cardboard, so that children could 
not tell what was inside. One of the experimenters opened the container to reveal a pair of 
shorts, a most unusual content. The container was closed again and the experimenters 
then asked the set of questions about the doll and God, in the following form: “What does 
X think is in the ho’ma?” In this experiment, children were not asked questions about 
other agents’ behaviour. However, Barrett et al. (2001) obtained very similar results 
when a sample of US children were asked a question about behaviour – “Where would 




Answers were coded as 1 when children said “tortillas” and 0 when they said “shorts.” 
The percentage of children answering “tortillas” in each age group for the doll and God is 


































Figure 2.3. False-belief task – Maya children. Error bars show ± 1 standard error. 
 
The answers for the doll showed a statistically significant positive correlation with age, 
r(46) = .341. Therefore, as age increased, Maya children were more likely to attribute 
false beliefs to the doll. For example, 33% of the 4-year-olds said that the doll would 
think tortillas were in the container compared to 77% of 7-year-olds. In contrast, children 
treated God differently from the doll – as in the US, no significant correlation was 
detected between answers for God and age, r(46) = .066. A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test 
for matched pairs comparing “tortillas” responses found significant differences between 
God and the doll for 5-year-olds (Z = -2.000, p = .046, N = 12) and 7-year-olds (Z = -
2.449, p = .014, N = 13), but not for 4- and 6-year olds.  
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When looking at the results, some patterns become apparent. The human line 
follows the same developmental course in both samples, but the Maya children seem to 
reliably pass the task about a year later than the American children. In the Maya sample, 
the difference between God and humans is not significant for 6-year-olds, while it is both 
for 5- and 7-year-olds. Furthermore, Maya children do not seem to reach the near-ceiling 
levels that are reported for many Euro-American samples of the same age on the ‘doll’ 
false belief question: a t-test against chance for 6- year-olds did not reach significance (t 
(11) =.75, p = .082); even 7-year-olds, while significantly above chance (t (12) =.77, p = 
.047), are below the performance level of the American sample. 
 
Discussion 
The vast majority of developmental studies of false-belief understanding in reference to 
humans focus on samples of Euro-American and East Asian children, often from 
relatively high SES backgrounds (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The cross-
cultural evidence available from traditional societies so far is incomplete and 
inconclusive. At any rate, the two available studies of traditional populations (Avis & 
Harris, 1991; Vinden, 1996) and the present one seem to show that there is some 
uniformity in the way false belief understanding develops, at least where human agency 
is concerned. However, even a brief inspection of the data presented above reveals that 
Yukatek children seem to be able to reliably pass a false-belief task only at age 7 
(although their performance level is extremely close, though not significantly above 
chance, a year before); besides, they fail to reach near-ceiling levels at the same age as 
the children in the American sample. One possible explanation is that children in this 
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community are less familiar than American children with the question/response format 
that characterizes this experimental task. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that 
we were not able to successfully test an adequate number of 3-year-olds due to their 
shyness, which does not usually pose problems to American experimenters. Another 
problem, now related to the God results, is the anomalous performance of 6-year-old 
Maya children. This is less easily explained, but may be due to small sample size. To 
fully account for the general delay in performance in relation to humans, and the 6 year 
olds’ performance in relation to God, further studies are needed.  
Now turning to the general discussion of the theoretical positions and their 
predictions, we can say that, while our results do not address the question of whether 
children consider the mother as a special kind of agent, they do add to the US findings in 
speaking against the idea that young children need to use humans as a basis to reason 
about God, which is the rationale behind all similarity positions. In this sense, the Maya 
results go in the direction of the non-similarity position, thus providing cross-cultural 
evidence for the perspective advanced by Barrett and collaborators.  
It is important to emphasize that this implies simply that young children do not 
treat God and humans in the same way in terms of attribution of beliefs. That children 
truly understand God as a different sort of agent, and not just a human with a few strange 
properties (e.g. infallible beliefs, ability to make mountains etc.) is difficult to 
disambiguate. Also, by no means do the data here support the claim that children’s 
concepts of God are completely independent of their understanding of people in general 
and their parents in particular. For example, Christian theology teaches about a God who 
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practiced self-anthropomorphization by becoming human in the form of Jesus of 
Nazareth.  
The present results, however, clearly demonstrate that Yukatek young children, as 
well as American young children, do not treat God as merely human. For this reason, this 
work joins the growing literature that provides evidence against Piaget’s notion that 
young children cannot treat other agents as importantly different from humans. For 
example, contrary to Piagetian artificialism (Piaget, 1969), Petrovich (1997) found that, 
although 4-year-olds know that humans make machines and God does not, when asked to 
account for the origins of natural objects such as large rocks or mountains, they gave God 
the credit and not people. Similarly, several studies have uncovered evidence that 4-year-
old (and, in some cases, older) children believe magicians are a special type of agent able 
to perform actions that apparently violate natural causation (Chandler & Lalonde, 1994; 
Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). Further, recent research suggests that 4- and 5-year-olds 
appreciate differences in perceptual abilities of different agents across sensory modalities 
(Richert & Barrett, 1999) and appreciate that God is more likely than humans to possess 
various forms of perceptual knowledge (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga, 2001). 
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The attribution of knowledge to others is a cornerstone of human sociality. The pervasive 
assumption that one’s beliefs, desires, and intentions are at least partly responsible for 
one’s actions is often accurate, and helps people interact with each other. It is likely that 
such an important capacity should have a cross-culturally robust ontogenetic path. The 
mechanisms through which humans attribute beliefs to others have been the object of 
numerous experimental studies in the last twenty-five years. We now have a good general 
picture of the way this capacity develops; children generally start correctly attributing 
beliefs to other humans in verbal tasks from the age of four (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001).  
 Recently, it has been found that much younger children may be able to make 
inferences about agents’ beliefs when non-verbal tasks are used (Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Some, 
however, have proposed that these results do not give evidence for the kind of belief 
attribution that is characteristics of older children (Perner & Ruffman, 2005), but rather 
for a more rudimentary capacity that is nonetheless developmentally connected with the 
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later language-dependent stage (Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). This appears to be 
confirmed by the finding that adults perform badly on nonverbal false-belief tasks while 
shadowing dialogue, but not while tapping a pre-recorded rhythm (Newton & de Villiers, 
2007).  
The research reviewed so far only deals with cases where the targets of belief 
attribution are fellow humans. Yet we know that humans also attribute beliefs to non-
human agents; both to natural entities like animals, and to entities that cannot be directly 
perceived – entities that often figure in religious and magic thought and that I will refer to 
as non-natural. 
 
In previous work (Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004), we provided one of the 
few empirical studies of false-belief understanding among children of small-scale, 
traditional societies. We showed that the development of this capacity roughly follows 
the same course that it does in the West. I say ‘roughly’ because in the case of Yukatek 
children the capacity to correctly attribute false beliefs to other humans appeared to 
emerge between ages 5 and 6, somewhat later than expected. This delay is probably 
explainable in terms of a combination of the lack of familiarity of Maya children with 
experimental procedures and of shyness in the face of strangers’ questioning.  
In the same article, we also showed that children’s development follows a 
different course when the beliefs are attributed to an all-knowing entity, in this case the 
Catholic God. As predicted by our hypothesis and suggested by previous results (Barrett, 
Richert, & Driesenga, 2001), children had no difficulty in appreciating that such an entity 
would always know what is invisible or otherwise unknowable to humans, and this 
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appreciation showed no developmental changes, as can be seen from the following table 
(see Materials, below, for a description of the other non-natural entities).  
 
Variable β SE Odds ratio Wald statistic
Human .685 .308 1.983 4.94*
Chiichi' .638 .301 1.892 4.48*
Masters/Sun .667 .301 1.949 4.91*
God .129 .291 1.138 .198
Effect of age
 
Table 2.1. Results of logistic regression of non-natural entity variables on age (* p < .05) 
 
In this paper, I would like to expand on the previous findings by presenting data 
concerning Yukatek children’s attribution of beliefs to a range of natural and non-natural 
entities. I start by looking at the overall picture of non-natural false-belief attribution, and 




The sample consisted of 46 Yukatek Maya children of ages ranging from four to nearly 
eight (average = 6.06, SD = 1.11). 25 children were male, and 21 female. The protocol 
was also piloted with some three-year-olds, but since most of them seemed to have 
difficulty in concentrating long enough they were dropped from the sample. All children 
resided in four small rural villages in the Quintana Roo state in the Yucatán peninsula 
(South-eastern Mexico). The overwhelming majority of people living in the rural interior 
of Quintana Roo are ethnic Maya. 
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The children generally began attending preschool at four or five years of age, and 
started primary school upon turning six. Both the local preschool and the primary school 
offer bilingual education, in Spanish and Yukatek Mayan. Although most individuals 
below the age of 50 are reasonably proficient in Spanish, the favoured language in the 
domestic environment is Yukatek. For this reason, most of the children who enter 
preschool are virtually monolingual in this language.  
Contrary to expectations, Yukatek families are quite small, with one or two 
offspring households being common. This is reflected in the declining birth-rate of 
Mexico (20.36 births per thousand inhabitants, in 2007 – compare with neighbouring 
Guatemala’s 29.09, according to the CIA world factbook), partly attributable to the 
Government’s family planning policies (Barber, 2007). 
 
Materials 
All children were interviewed either in the hut of the experimenters or in their family’s 
hut, in Yukatek, by a native speaker and ethnic Maya who has participated in several 
other studies in the region and is known to many of the participants’ families. The natural 
agents used included a doll named Soledad, representing a human, and four stuffed toys 
representing animals commonly found in the area: a dog, a peccary (kitam, similar to a 
wild boar), a bee, and a jaguar. Children were instructed to think of these dolls as 
representing real humans and animals. The non-natural agents were the Catholic God (the 
Maya have adopted this religious entity into their pantheon several centuries ago), the 
Sun (k’in), the Masters of the forest (arux or uyumil k’aax), and minor spirits known as 
Chiichi’. The Yukatek God concept differs in interesting ways from that of mainstream 
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Catholicism, but, more relevantly, it shares with it the characteristic of omniscience. The 
existence of the Sun as a divinity among the pre-Hispanic Maya is well documented 
(Vail, 2000), and it still figures in the contemporary pantheon. The Masters of the forest 
are described as taking human or animal forms, appearing in the corn fields (milpas) or in 
the forest at night, and serving in some ways as administrators of shared natural resources 
and protectors of crops and harvests, when appeased (Zolla, 1994). Finally, the Chiichi’ 
are spirits often invoked by parents to instil fear into children who misbehave – they thus 
appear to play much the same role as the bogeyman in the USA. While adults state that 
they believe in the existence of the other non-natural entities, none does so for the 
Chiichi’. All of the supernatural entities were not visually represented, but simply named 
to the children.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed either in the hut of the experimenters or in their 
family’s hut. The experiment consisted in a version of the “surprising contents” task, 
described in Chapter II. Before running the experiment, checks were run to make sure 
that the participant was familiar with each of the natural and supernatural entities; all 
children turned out to be. The nine questions were then asked in random order. Children 




Natural and Non-natural Entities across Ages 
The overall proportions of children answering ‘yes’ (that is, stating that the entity knows 
what is inside the container) and ‘no’ to each of the nine stimulus questions is presented 
in figure 3.1. The contrast between the human and God stimuli, whose development was 
investigated in the previous paper, is immediately evident, but also evident is the 
similarity between the human, animal, and Chiichi’ stimuli, that between the Sun and the 
Masters of the forest, and the overall peculiarity of the response pattern to the God probe.  
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Doesn't know actual contents Knows actual contents
Figure 3.1. Proportion of response categories (N = 46) 
 
McNemar tests (N = 46 for all) reveal a statistical difference between the human and God 
variables, as expected (p = .001), but no difference between the human and other natural 
and non-natural probes. Children’s answer to the God question, however, were found to 
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differ from those given to other non-natural entity questions (Chiichi’, p = .002; Sun and 
Masters of the forest, p = .008 for both), as well as animal questions (Dog and Peccary, p 
= .003 for both; Jaguar, p = .006; Bee, p = .022). On this measure of omniscience, God 
thus appears to be perceived as performing better than all other entities.  
 
Individual Differences 
An interesting pattern emerges when dividing the sample into two groups based on how 
participants answered the human false-belief questions, and then compared the 

































Doesn't know actual contents Knows actual contents
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of response categories, human false belief test passers (N = 28) 
 
McNemar tests show that virtually all participants who answered that the doll would 
know what is in the container (N = 18) also answered that God, the Sun, the Masters of 
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the forest, the Chiichi’, and all the animals would know. Furthermore, children in this 
group did not differentiate between God and any of the other non-natural entities. 
Conversely, children who answered that the doll would not be aware of the surprising 
contents (N = 28) gave different responses for God (p < .001), and the Sun and the 
Masters of the forest (p = .031 for both), though not for the Chiichi’ (n.s.). Again in 
contrast to the previous group, these children also differentiated between God and both 
the Sun and the Masters of the forest (p = .008), as well as between God and the Chiichi’ 
(p < .001) and God and all the animals (Dog, p < .001; Peccary and Jaguar, p = .001; Bee, 
p = .006). In other words, children who incorrectly said that a human would know about 
the surprising contents extended this property to all natural and non-natural entities. 
Those who passed the false belief test with the human stimulus instead differentiated 
between different types of entities, classifying the animals and Chiichi’ as 
indistinguishable from humans, the classical Mayan divinities the Sun and the Masters of 
the forest as being unlike humans and Chiichi’ on the one hand and God on the other, and 




The data show that Yukatek children are able to use their knowledge of natural and non-
natural entities when attributing beliefs to them. Children were shown to differentiate 
between humans, animals, and local non-natural entities on the one hand, and the 
Catholic God on the other. As previous studies suggest, it is likely that the properties that 
are commonly associated with the concept of God make it very salient and distinctive for 
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a majority of the children in the sample (Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, Richert, & 
Driesenga, 2001; Boyer, 1994; Boyer, 2001; Knight, Sousa, Barrett, & Atran, 2004; 
Richert & Barrett, 1999).  
It was also found that the capacity to correctly attribute false beliefs to humans in 
a surprising-contents task does not result in the child indiscriminately attributing false 
beliefs to all natural and non-natural entities. Children who pass the test show a nuanced 
understanding of the beliefs of different entities. In contrast, children who fail the test 
tended to adopt a blanket approach, attributing the same beliefs to both natural and non-
natural entities almost without exception.  
The analysis of individual differences also raises an important methodological 
point. Since the questions posed to the children in our sample (and in many other false-
belief experiments) could be answered with a yes or a no, the results can be interpreted in 
at least two different ways. On the one hand, it is possible that children attribute beliefs in 
a stable manner – that is, it may be that at each age point children either do or do not 
attribute human-like beliefs to any of the entities they were asked about. On the other, it 
is possible that at some ages (particularly when overall performance in false-belief tasks 
hovers around chance level) children attribute beliefs in an unstable, probabilistic way – 
for example, they may answer ‘yes’ 30% and ‘no’ 70% of the time.4 A repeated-measures 
approach would help us to disambiguate these possibilities, but it is not immediately 
evident how one could go about implementing it. Since we are looking at a mental 
process that is affected by development, the gap between tests repetitions should not be 
longer than a few weeks; otherwise, it would be impossible to say whether the child who 
                                                 
4 It is, of course, also possible that some children in each age group have a consistent approach and others 
do not.  
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attributed true beliefs in the first test and false in the second is using a probabilistic 
approach or has developed a capacity for mindreading. But frequent re-testing is not the 
answer either, because it introduces the confounding variable of training effects.  
The fact that children were asked about nine different entities in one sitting, while 
not resolving the question altogether, can be used to argue for children mostly adopting a 
consistent approach to belief attribution. Both children who pass the human false-belief 
test and those who do not are remarkably consistent in their judgements – if a significant 
proportion of them were to have answered the questions probabilistically, we would not 
have expected to see such uniform results.  
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Culture, Class, and Cognition: Evidence from Italy 
 
Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001) have argued that East Asians are inclined to reason and perceive in a 
holistic fashion, that is to say, to emphasize relationships and similarities among objects 
and events in the broad perceptual and conceptual field. Westerners instead tend to reason 
more analytically, that is, to focus on a central object (or person) and its attributes and to 
reason about it using categories and rules.  
A variety of findings support these contentions. For example, Abel and Hsu 
(1949) found that Chinese-American participants gave more whole card response to 
Rorschach inkblots than did European Americans, whereas Americans gave more 
responses that referred only to a part of the inkblot. Ji, Peng and Nisbett (2000) found that 
Chinese participants were more field dependent in the rod and frame test: when making 
judgments of the verticality of the rod, they were more influenced by the position of the 
frame. Ji et al. also found that Chinese participants were better able to gauge degree of 
relationship among elements presented in the perceptual field. Masuda and Nisbett (2001) 
presented animated vignettes of underwater scenes to Japanese and American participants 
and asked them to report what they saw. Japanese reported many more field or context 
elements than did Americans, who tended to emphasize attributes of central objects. Chiu 
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(1972) presented triplets of pictures (e.g., cow, chicken, grass) to American and Chinese 
children and asked them which two belonged together. American children tended to 
group based on categorical associations (cow goes with chicken because they are both 
animals); Chinese children tended to group based on relationship (the cow eats the grass). 
Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (2004) showed the same phenomenon with college students using 
words instead of pictures. Norenzayan, Smith, Kim and Nisbett (2002) examined the 
category learning of East Asians and Americans. They found that East Asians made many 
categorization errors when the object they were trying to categorize bore a strong 
resemblance to an exemplar of another category. Americans were much less likely to 
make categorization errors under these circumstances. 
Nisbett and his colleagues have argued that these differential perceptual and 
cognitive tendencies are rooted in the different social practices of the two regions. East 
Asians are more dependent on each other in many respects, and their attention is focused 
on the social world and hence the field as a whole. In general, Westerners are less 
dependent on each other and hence have the luxury of focusing on a central object and 
their goals with respect to it. For instance, for most Westerners categorization is based on 
the features of the object, and rules are those that are presumed to apply to the relevant 
categories. The rules brought to bear are presumed helpful in predicting and controlling 
the behaviour of the object. The more frequent application of rules independently of 
context (and semantic content) is thus a distinguishing feature of Western cognition. 
Until now, the study of cognitive variability deriving from differences in social 
organization and social practice has been restricted to cross-national comparisons. 
However, inasmuch as nations are relatively recent products of complex historical 
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processes, they are not homogeneous cultural entities. Thus, we may expect to find some 
differences between a nation's subcultures. 
An interesting test case is offered by Italy. The history of this country is peculiar 
because its northern and southern areas were characterized by quite different forms of 
social and political organization for many centuries before independence and unification. 
Independent communes, insulated to a degree from the power of monarchs, formed 
themselves in northern Italy as early as the late Middle Ages. Citizens participated in 
these communal republics in relatively unconstrained fashion, and the formation of craft 
guilds increased the degree of freedom of these communes. The South, governed with an 
iron hand by Norman kings, failed to foster civic involvement, social responsibility, and 
mutual assistance, which favoured the development of the Mafia and of clientelismo – 
vertical systems of patron-client exchanges involving lopsided reciprocal obligations (the 
more powerful person in the exchange gaining the most from the relationship). Networks 
of civic engagement found in the North, such as neighbourhood associations, 
cooperatives, sports clubs, etc., were instrumental in creating a dense network in 
communities, which in turn facilitated free cooperation between citizens (Banfield, 1958; 
Putnam, 1993). This kind of cooperation was characterized by voluntary association, 
rather than hierarchical relations or close kinship ties. One intriguing cognitive measure 
supporting the existence of a difference in social orientation between northern and 
southern Italians is reflected in the type of insults people favour. While the frequency of 
insults directed at the person (stupid, etc.) is approximately the same in both regions, 
Southerners have been found to use “collective” insults, directed at the target’s family, 
more frequently (Semin & Rubini, 1990). Given the above evidence, we would expect 
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southern Italians to be more concerned with relationships in their social and cognitive 
habits than northern Italians. Thus northern Italians are relatively independent in their 
social practices whereas southern Italians are relatively interdependent. If so, then we 
might expect the cognitive habits of Northerners to resemble those of Americans, that is, 
to be relatively analytic, and the cognitive habits of Southerners to resemble those of 
Asians, that is, to be relatively holistic. 
Intra-national comparisons need not be restricted to different regions. Different 
social classes differ in their social practices. Many of the differences attributable to class 
can be explained in terms of the different social environments afforded by wealthier and 
poorer family life. For example, comparisons of working and middle class communities 
in the US have shown that parent/child interaction differs in ways that affect children’s 
cognition – for example by making children more or less prepared for the kind of 
question/answer scripts they will encounter in mainstream schooling (Heath, 1986) or by 
causing children to perceive themselves as more or less autonomous entities (Andersen, 
1986). Across the world, lower SES individuals have also been found to have more 
frequent contact with kin (Allan, 1979; Rossi-Doria, 1962/1948); to perceive themselves 
to have less self-efficacy (Gecas, 1989) and less internal locus of control (Kohn, 1969; 
Mirowsky & Ross, 1986) – and, realistically, they tend to have fewer opportunities for 
choice and self-direction in their lives (Inkeles, 1969; Kohn, 1969). Socialization for 
higher SES children involves teaching independence and self-discovery and is more 
likely to emphasize obedience for lower SES children in both America (Kohn, 1969) and 
Italy (Pearlin & Kohn, 1966). Thus it may be possible that differences in social 
orientation derive from factors such as relative wealth, in addition to long-term historical 
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processes. If that is true, we may expect lower-SES people to be relatively more 
interdependent, because of the forms of social structure and practices that are associated 
with class membership (see Kohn, 1969; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). In fact, the 
importance (both positive and negative) of kin-based social networks in poor societies is 
a well-investigated phenomenon in economics and anthropology (Knack & Keepher, 
1997; Stack, 1974; Wiessner, 1982). If working-class people are more interdependent in 
their social orientation than middle-class people then we might expect them to be more 
holistic in their cognitive habits than middle-class people. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present the results of a study examining 
whether the well-documented subcultural differences in social practice are associated 
with measurable cognitive effects. The task, adapted from Ji et al. (2004), consisted of a 
printed list of twenty items, each composed of three words (e.g., Monkey, Panda, 
Banana). This task is akin to that originally used by Chiu (1972), except that we – like Ji 
et al. (2004) – employed written words instead of pictures as stimuli. Participants were 
asked to choose which two of the three words in each item “went together” by circling 
them. The words in each item could be grouped in two meaningful ways, one showing 
preference for thematic relationships (e.g., Monkey and Banana), the other for categorical 
relations (e.g., Monkey and Panda).  
 Ji et al. (2004) found that relatively interdependent Chinese participants strongly 
preferred pairing items according to their thematic relationships, while relatively 
independent Americans favoured categorical relations. We hypothesized that southern 
Italians and low SES participants, because of their greater social interdependence, would 
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Participants were recruited among final-year students in four Italian high schools. The 
schools were selected to include two ‘classics’ orientation high schools, one in the North 
(Milan) and one in the South (Naples), and two IPSIAs (Istituti Professionali di Stato per 
l’Industria e l’Artigianato, or State Professional Institutes for Industry and Crafts), one in 
the North (Monza, close to Milan) and one in the South (Crotone, in the district of 
Calabria). 
In Italy, high school students can choose among several educational paths; they 
can study ancient Greek and Latin in addition to literature, history, and philosophy (the 
‘classics’ orientation, which is perceived as the most prestigious); they can focus on 
mathematics, physics, and chemistry (the ‘scientific’ orientation); or they can learn 
several modern languages (the ‘linguistic’ orientation). In addition to these, there are 
several other courses of study available, mostly focusing on the acquisition of practical 
(electronic, electrical, mechanical, and chemical) trade skills. Institutes offering trade-
oriented training, known as IPSIAs, rank lower on the prestige scale than the three non-
trade-oriented kinds of schools described above, but children who attend them to 
graduation still represent a privileged segment of the population, since at the time the 
study was conducted formal education in Italy was only compulsory to age 16. 
The final sample included 268 students recruited from four schools. The schools 
were chosen to be representative of the region and of two different class levels (upper 
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middle, represented by the Classics orientation schools, and lower to lower middle, 
represented by the IPSIAs). Though no data were collected on the earnings of the 
students’ families, we take the content of the student’s educational path (more theoretical 
in the case of classics schools, more applied in the case of IPSIAs) and the location of the 
school (center of a large city for classics schools, and either periphery of a large city or 
small town for IPSIAs) to be reliable proxies for family SES, and by extension, class 
membership.5 The final sample comprised four groups: North, high SES (N = 59), North, 
low SES (N = 47), South, high SES (N = 75), and South, low SES (N = 74).  
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested by paper and pencil in Italian. Access to the participants was 
granted by the principal of each school as well as the teacher, during whose teaching time 
the tests were administered. Students signed a sheet outlining their rights as participants, 
and kept a copy for reference.  
Seven out of the twenty groups of words were test items, the remaining thirteen 
being fillers. The test items were dispersed among the fillers; the relative order of the 
three terms in each test item was also counterbalanced. Each test item response was 
coded as either 1 (denoting thematic classification) or 0 (denoting categorical 
classification). Meaningless pairings (e.g., Panda and Banana) were only chosen 47 times 
out of 1,752 total answers, and, given both the rarity of their occurrence and their 
irrelevance to the hypotheses being tested, were left out of the analysis. The scores on the 
                                                 
5 It could be argued that a complete analysis would require location to be crossed with both orientation and 
region, but this is not possible because there are no Classics orientation high schools either in the periphery 
of large cities or in smaller towns. Since in Italy wealthier people are likely to reside in the central areas of 
larger cities, we take this to corroborate the idea that study orientation closely matches SES/class 
distributions. 
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seven test items were averaged for each individual, resulting in a continuous proportion 
ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger preference for thematic 
relationships. 
The statements were translated by the first author, whose first language is Italian, 
and who is fluent in English. The items’ intelligibility was tested on several Italian native 





























Figure 4.1. Proportion of thematic pairings by school and SES. Bars represent ± one standard 
error. 
 
Scores were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance with two levels of SES (low, 
high) and two of Region (North, South). Results are presented graphically in Figure 4.1. 
There was a main effect of region, indicating a significantly greater preference of 
southern participants for thematic pairing, F(1, 251) = 29.14, p <.001. The interaction of 
region and SES also reached significance, indicating that SES had a greater effect in the 
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South than in the North, F(1, 251) = 5.74, p <.05. A series of Tukey HSD post-hoc tests 
was run on the individual group scores. The South, low SES group was found to differ 
from all others (North, high SES: mean diff. .22, p <.001; North, low SES: mean diff. .24, 
p <.001; South, high SES: mean diff .13, p <.01); the South, high SES group was 
marginally significantly different from the North, low SES group (mean diff. .12, p .056); 
no other differences were found. Thus, within the South, lower SES participants were 
more likely to choose thematic associations than higher SES participants, showing a 
social class effect, whereas there was no SES difference among the Northerners. 
Although these results cannot be directly compared to those of Ji et al. (2004) as the 
stimulus set was not exactly the same, it may be noted that the Southerners in our sample 
are closer to the classification style of their Chinese participants than to that of the 
Americans. 
One-sample t-tests against chance (.5 level) showed a preference for thematic 
sorting significant at the p <.001 level for the overall sample (M = .723, t(254) = 13.68, 
for both regional groups (North: M = .626, t(105) = 4.79; South: M = .792, t(148) = 




The present research is an extension of previous findings in that it shows that 
different social practices within a nation can affect the way people deal with a simple 
cognitive task. We show that this is true of subcultures that share a language, many years 
of common history, and (in the case of SES) even the same geographical location. We 
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found that, as predicted, the preference of the southern Italian participants for thematic 
categorization was stronger than that of their northern counterparts, and thus more 
strongly shifted in the Asian direction. With regard to SES, a marked difference in 
categorization style in the expected direction was found for southern Italy, but not for 
northern Italy. 
Overall, our results strongly support our hypothesis that cognitive differences may 
be found between groups not separated by vast geographical distances or thousands of 
years of lack of contact. Italy is a strongly integrated nation with a single official 
language, and yet it houses regional subcultures, which, in spite of their proximity, are 
dissimilar enough to produce significant measurable differences in cognition. The results 
also show that social class may affect people’s performance on simple cognitive tasks. 
However, the presence of an interaction between region and SES suggests the existence 
of a complex relationship between the two. Rather than speculating about the nature of 
this relationship, we choose the route of further research.  
The results provide indirect support for the contention of Nisbett and his 
colleagues (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, et al., 2001) that the cognitive differences they find 
between Asians and Westerners are due to the social differences, namely that the 
interdependence of Asians prompts attention to relationships whereas the independence 
of Westerners encourages a focus on objects and their proper categorization. Southern 
Italians, and working class people in the West, resemble Asians in that their social 
relations are of a relatively interdependent nature. Northern Italians, and middle class 
people in the West, have social structures and practices that foster independence. 
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Some Problems with Property Ascription 
 
Ascription in General 
Through fieldwork, anthropologists acquire knowledge about what individuals in a social 
group tend to do and say. They also progressively become able to make accurate 
inferences about the desires, beliefs, preferences, etc. of some individuals in that group. 
In writing ethnography, anthropologists routinely ascribe such behavioural and mental 
properties to some or all individuals in their chosen population. In this paper, we look at 
some troublesome aspects of the practice of ascription in anthropology. To begin, we 
need to specify what we mean by ascription. 
 
Ascription refers to the practice of attributing a property to an individual or a 
group. There are several kinds of ascription, dealing with different aspects of the 
individual or group in which one is interested. Most individual physical properties can be 
ascribed after a single observation (e.g., “x has blue eyes”). In contrast, behavioural 
properties, while observable, require at least repeated observation to be accurate. For 
example, imagine that an observer wishes to state that a certain individual wears hats – 
clearly, a single observation of hat-wearing behaviour is not sufficient. Of course, this is 
not to say that individual behavioural properties cannot be ascribed at all. Someone need 
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only observe a consistent pattern over a period of time and report it; if the person in 
question wears a hat significantly more frequently than others in his social group,6 then 
the ascription is warranted. This is not to say that it is an error-proof endeavour; for 
example, once a working hypothesis has been established (in this case, that someone 
wears hats), the observer can unwittingly assign more weight to instances that confirm, 
rather than disconfirm, the hypothesis.7 Luckily, biases of this sort can easily be 
controlled by simple statistical means.  
 
In many cases anthropologists are interested in going beyond simple behavioural 
observations to describe mental activity – beliefs, desires, preferences, emotions, etc. 
This endeavour still requires the anthropologist to rely on the observation of behaviour, 
and to infer the existence and characteristics of mental activity from those observations.8 
This process of inference is more error-prone than that involved in the ascription of 
readily observable properties, such as behavioural or physical traits, because an 
inferential step is added in order to understand the non-observable cognitive processes 
believed to be the cause of behaviour (Jones, 2000). The complexity of this inferential 
                                                 
6 Just how much of the time one needs to be wearing a hat to have that property ascribed depends on one’s 
assumptions and objectives. For example, imagine we want to contrast the behaviour of an individual – call 
him Paul – with some people who never wear hats. If we want to ascribe to Paul the behavioural property 
of hat wearing, we might be satisfied if he wears a hat only infrequently. In contrast, if our aim is to 
compare Paul to a group of people who often wear hats, the proportion of time when Paul wears a hat needs 
to be significantly higher if the ascription is to be more than trivial. This of course is also true if we 
substitute groups for individuals. 
7 Comprehensive descriptions of the psychological characteristics of this and other biases are available in 
many textbooks and collections, including those edited by Kahneman & Tversky (2000) and Gilovich et al. 
(2002).  
8 Not all mental activity is inaccessible to the same degree. For example, it is argued that physiological 
markers of some emotions, such as fear or embarrassment, can be directly measured without necessarily 
having to look at measures of mental activity. Similarly, behavioural economists are able to elicit 
preferences by having people make choices in experimental situations, rather than stating their preferences 
outright. The advantage of these techniques is that they allow the investigator to circumvent problems 
inherent in self-report described by Nisbett & Wilson (1977).  
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process is also compounded by the fact that we do not yet fully comprehend the nature of 
thought.  
 
To appreciate the extra layer of complexity that this problem generates, consider 
the following comparison. Celestial bodies that are too remote to be visible from earth, 
while not observable, can still be perceived in many cases. The discovery of their 
existence (and the estimation of their location and mass) often derives from the 
observation of unexpected movements in the trajectory of other, visible objects. Thus 
astrophysicists, like anthropologists, have to rely on the observation of the perceivable in 
order to make inferences about the non-perceivable. But anthropologists encounter an 
additional problem. The visible and invisible objects in which astrophysicists are 
interested are fundamentally homogeneous. This has resulted in the establishment of 
standard procedures for locating non-visible objects in space. Thought, on the other hand, 
is quite different from behaviour. Thinking ultimately takes the form of electrical activity 
in the brain. Beyond that, there is no agreed-upon description of the form of mental 
activity except that it consists in some sort of computation. That is problematic, because 
the neural level is not necessarily the most valuable level of description of all cognitive 
processes.  
 
Psychology, and the cognitive sciences in general, have not yet reached a stage of 
development where they can produce laws of mental activity comparable to those of 
astrophysics. Because there exist no universally applicable formal principles to guide 
belief ascription, social scientists often use an intuitive process. This, a component of the 
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human ‘mindreading’ system (Harris, 1992; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Perner, 1993; 
Wellman, 1990; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), is remarkably efficient in guiding 
our everyday interactions with other human beings (and some animals, some imaginary 
entities, and perhaps even some inanimate objects), and as such it is routinely exploited 
by anthropologists in the field, even without their awareness. Lienhardt (1961), while 
describing an instance of Dinka sacrifice, invokes the notion of ‘collective concentration’ 
of attention on a single action, and postulates that this is a defining characteristic of such 
ritual activity. Lienhardt does not operationalize this notion or speculate on its 
psychological nature; and yet, as inferred by Carrithers (1992), he is able to perceive that 
collective concentration is taking place from a variety of cues such as eye gaze, body 
orientation, and changes in activity. The nature of many intuitive cognitive systems 
devoted to the understanding of social dynamics is such that they are often employed by 
anthropologists in the field before becoming the object of psychological research. Indeed, 
psychological arguments for the existence and importance of the joint attention 
mechanism as a building block of the human capacity for culture have only recently been 
made by Tomasello et al. (2005). 
 
The capacity of anthropologists to use intuitive, informal attribution has the 
distinct advantage of allowing them to understand the people they study with reasonably 
high success and reasonably little effort, and to pass on this knowledge to others. At the 
same time, the unreflective use of ascription can lead to inaccurate or misleading 
descriptions. By way of example, let us consider a typical anthropological ascription: 
The Dobuans are bad sailors, hugging the reef and disembarking every night 
(Benedict, 1989/1934, p. 157. Our emphasis). 
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The italicized claim is a behavioural ascription, based on Reo Fortune’s observations 
during his fieldwork in Dobu, and is entirely justifiable – assuming that it is supported by 
easily obtainable and verifiable evidence. We can guess that Fortune accurately observed 
that Dobuans did not stray far from the reef, nor did they show any willingness to sail 
overnight (in sharp contrast with the members of other Melanesian societies). But note 
that the quote also carries an implicit ascription of a mental property, captured by the 
evaluative expression ‘bad sailors.’ In this case, it is clear that by the use of the word 
‘bad’ Fortune intends to emphasize that the Dobuans’ tendency to hug the reef does not 
derive from, say, a religious rule prohibiting high-seas navigation, but rather from the fact 
that the Dobuans, lacking any special necessity to engage in demanding sailing activities, 
devote little effort to the improvement of their nautical skills. 
 
It would be surprising if a competent anthropologist such as Fortune had 
completely failed to grasp the reason for the Dobuans’ lack of sailing proficiency; readers 
are aware of that and so, when reading the above statement, are immediately able to 
understand what it entails. But not all forms of ascription are as useful as this one; and the 
ease with which anthropologists produce ascriptions, and readers understand them, means 
that some misleading ones may well go unnoticed.  
 
There are many ways in which ascription can be misleading. We will focus on 
what we see as the most common and problematic cases, namely those where: 
1. A property is ascribed to a collective entity, but it is unevenly distributed among 
social sub-groupings; 
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2. An ascribed mental property is alleged to cause an individual’s behaviour, but its 
existence is empirically unsupported;  
3. A belief is ascribed to an individual, although another belief that effectively 
contradicts the first one is also entertained by the same individual. 
The first sort of problem has been recognized by anthropologists and has been, in our 
opinion, successfully dealt with. The other two, which deal with anthropological claims 
about cognition, will need to be rethought in the light of what we now know about the 
operating principles of the mind. 
 
Collective Ascription and Social Variability 
Collective ascription refers to the practice of attributing properties to groups rather than 
individuals. This is in many ways unavoidable, in that the aim of most anthropologists is 
to present culturally distributed patterns of action and belief, rather than idiosyncratic 
ones. However, when a property is unevenly distributed among the members of a society, 
and its distribution happens to map onto some social sub-groupings, ascribing that 
property to the entire society is unwarranted.  
 
A number of anthropologists, starting more formally with the establishment of the 
‘ethnoscience’ approach in the 1960s, have tried to show how collective ascription has 
the potential to mask the diversity present in even the smallest society (Bernard et al., 
1986; Pelto & Pelto, 1975; Rodseth, 1998; Vayda, 1994). While these anthropologists did 
not dispute the usefulness of generalized abstraction, they also believe that it should not 
be the discipline’s single aim or sole form of presentation of evidence. Vayda (1994) and 
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Pelto & Pelto (1975) went further by saying that the study of variation is potentially even 
more revealing than the study of shared properties. This approach takes as its starting 
point empirical observations of intra-cultural differences in knowledge or belief and tries 
to map them onto grouping variables such as age, urbanisation, and gender. These 
grouping variables are implicitly assumed to be (at least in part) causally responsible for 
the existence of differences. A number of empirical studies demonstrate the existence of, 
and propose explanations for, intra-cultural differences in a variety of domains, 
including: preference for delayed economic gratification in Uganda, across the 
rural/urban axis (Thompson, 1975); medical knowledge in a Tarascan community, across 
age and expertise levels (Garro, 1986); botanical knowledge among the Aguaruna, across 
expertise levels (Boster, 1986); and beliefs about the role and significance of 
breastfeeding among the Navajo, across age and degree of bilingualism (Wright, Bauer, 
Clark, Morgan, & Begishe, 1993). It has now become impossible for anthropologists to 
ignore the uneven distribution of cultural content across adults in any society.  
 
More recently, some anthropologists have proposed that differences between 
children and adults are also very relevant. In particular, Toren (1993) and Hirschfeld 
(2002) have noted how, since anthropology is primarily concerned with culture, and since 
much of culture is believed to be socially transmitted, interactions between older and 
younger generations are presumably responsible for the reproduction of a large amount of 
cultural knowledge. In spite of these crucial implications for the study of culture, and of 
the availability of several ethnographies dealing with childrearing practices, child health 
and nutrition and other related matters, no strong anthropological interest in development 
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has emerged. Conversely, the psychological study of cognitive development has 
generated an impressive number of findings relating to the development of the 
understanding of the biological world, other people’s beliefs and desires, number and 
mathematics, physics, and social groupings, which are all but ignored by anthropologists, 
regardless of how relevant they may be to their concerns. The use of collective ascription 
(perhaps a reflection of this neglect) can obscure the highly important processes whereby 
culture is acquired, and misleadingly present an image of society where a 7-year-old, an 
adolescent, an adult, and an elderly person perceive and think about the world in just the 
same way.   
 
The theoretical stance of these ethnoscientists and developmental anthropologists, 
regardless of their differences, contrasts sharply with old and new defenders of the 
particularistic approach, particularly of the postmodern variety (e.g., Crapanzano, 1980; 
Price, 1998), who, while anti-essentialist in orientation, are not concerned with the 
explanation of variability. The non-postmodern approach to intra-cultural variability, we 
might say, is concerned with variability that is not random with respect to the socio-
cultural environment (Malley & Knight, forthcoming). Many postmodern 
anthropologists, instead, are in general interested in variability per se. Variability, in this 
latter sense, is perceived as being irreducible to social or cultural categories – or at least 
such reduction is judged to be uninteresting.  
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Ascription of Empirically Under-Supported Mental Properties 
The type of collective ascription criticized above fails because social variability is not 
taken into account. If a property is temporary or in flux, or if not all members of a social 
group can be shown to possess a certain property to a similar extent, unqualified 
collective ascription is not an adequate means of description. Other problems with 
ascription are neither as obvious to see nor as easy to correct. In some cases, 
anthropologists explicitly state that the property they ascribe to a group is meant to be 
possessed by all of its members; the degree of intra-cultural variability is presumed to be 
minimal.9 There is nothing psychologically unsound about this approach; but if the 
ascribed property proves to be empirically unsupported, the ascription is unwarranted. 
Here, we look at two examples: the ascription of ‘structuring’ and ‘irrational’ beliefs.  
 
The Ascription of ‘Structuring’ Beliefs 
Naming one of his influences as Freudian psychoanalysis, Lévi-Strauss is well-known for 
ascribing unconscious motives to people that cause their thoughts to be structured in 
certain cross-culturally recurring ways. Defenders of the structuralist approach postulate 
the existence of a level of cognition which is inaccessible to conscious thought, but which 
nonetheless informs it. Lévi-Strauss, like Freud, insisted (quite rightly, as it turns out) 
that people are often unaware of what drives them to action. The Lévi-Straussian 
unconscious, however, differs in significant respects from the Freudian one, most 
                                                 
9 In the previous section, we encountered cases where the property shows variability, and where this 
variability can be shown to map onto social subgroupings. Now we are going to deal with cases where the 
property is supposed not to show variability, and therefore to be equally distributed among social 
subgroupings. There is, of course, another possibility: that the property shows variability, and that the 
variability does not map onto social subgroupings. An example of such a property is blood type; properties 
of this kind are not interesting to anthropologists, because their presence and distribution in a population 
are not attributable to socio-cultural processes. 
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importantly in that the former is not thought to originate in the affective bonds of the 
family and society (Hénaff, 1998). In a sense, Lévi-Strauss adds to claims about the 
psychic unity of humanity a multi-layered view of the mind, in which primacy is given to 
the structuring unconscious (the mind that causes) over the conscious (the mind that 
thinks). But besides the now dated characterization of psychological processes as either 
fully accessible or fully inaccessible to consciousness, the problem with structuralism and 
similar psychoanalytic theories is that most of the explanatory work is done by mental 
structures whose nature and workings are extremely vague. As a result, while they can be 
invoked to produce plausible a posteriori explanations of certain phenomena, it is very 
difficult to produce a test that can give evidence for the phenomena being the product of 
these structures, or of some quite different structures or processes. 
 
For example, Lévi-Strauss proposes that all humans are endowed with a 
‘dualistic’ or ‘binary’ mind. A direct consequence of this is that all sorts of cultural 
phenomena – ranging from social organization patterns to categorization to myth – are 
dually structured, one part standing in opposition to the other in various ways. While it is 
true that many cultural products are indeed dually structured, we should not immediately 
subscribe to Lévi-Strauss’ conclusion that they are so structured because they are a 
product of a dualistic mind. Indeed, almost everything we know about cognition today 
suggests that the brain is a collection of specialized mechanisms dedicated to handle 
specific input (see for example the papers in Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Lévi-Strauss’ 
theory can account for the patterns we observe, but it is neither strongly predictive 
(because all sorts of cultural objects can stand in all sorts of binary, ternary, quaternary, 
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etc. opposing relations to almost anything else), nor does it converge with other evidence 
about mental processes.  
 
Other symbolic approaches run into similar problems. Jones (2000) classifies 
structuralist ascriptions of cognitive properties as a type within the category of ascription 
of unconscious symbolic beliefs, which he defines as “[beliefs] in which, without being 
aware of it, one categorizes things as having attributes far different from the ones that 
appear on the surface” (p. 132). Jones observes that the cognitively naïve theory of the 
unconscious that characterize such kinds of ascription make it impossible to decide which 
thoughts are being processed beyond what can be directly perceived from the 
environment. This impossibility makes the choice of one thought over others as 
explanatory arbitrary. Jones defends the idea that there are empirically sound ways to 
constrain the range of possible thoughts taking place in someone’s mind at a specific 
time. Psychological theory, unlike structuralist and psychoanalytic theories, allows one to 
place such constraints by postulating that the mind is organized in such a way that only a 
restricted number of related thoughts can become available at any one time. The 
associative structure of semantic memory is an example of a mechanism that could serve 
this purpose, at least in some cases.  
 
The Ascription of ‘Irrational’ Beliefs 
‘The Bororo…boast that they are red Araras [Macaws].’ That does not simply 
mean that after their death they become Araras, nor that the Araras are Bororo 
metamorphosed, and must be treated as such. It means another thing altogether. 
‘The Bororo,’ states von den Steinen, who did not want to believe them, but had 
to give in to their formal statements, ‘quite clearly state that they actually are 
Araras, exactly as if a caterpillar stated that it is a butterfly.’ This is not a name 
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that they are giving themselves; this is not a parentage that they are proclaiming. 
What they want to mean is a relationship of fundamental identity. (Lévy-Bruhl 
(1910, part I, ch. 2), quoting von den Steinen (1894): authors’ translation)  
 
This is a well-known account of lowland South American Indians recorded by von den 
Steinen and used by Lévy-Bruhl as one of the main pieces of evidence for his theory of 
primitive mentality. This sort of ascription carries with it the implication that some 
fundamental cognitive properties displayed by the traditional subjects of anthropological 
inquiry differ dramatically from those of Westerners. Debates about the rationality of 
‘primitives’ have a long history in philosophy and the social sciences and focus on many 
different aspects (Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Wilson, 1970). Here, we will focus on 
‘irrational’ beliefs of the sort reported by von den Steinen and briefly sketch the two most 
popular positions taken in this debate – intellectualism and symbolism – and one possible 
solution to the disagreements, and then relate these three positions to the practice of 
ascription.   
 
Many anthropologists of the late 19th and early 20th century were concerned with 
showing how ‘irrational’ beliefs such as those relating to magic were in fact fully 
rational, given the limited or erroneous knowledge available to people in the specific 
group in which such beliefs obtained. This approach, championed by J. G. Frazer (Frazer, 
1976/1890) among others, has become known as ‘intellectualism.’ In contrast, defendants 
of the symbolist approach like Mary Douglas, Victor Turner, and Lévi-Strauss propose 
that the language used to express apparently irrational beliefs is not to be interpreted 
literally. Such beliefs are simply an indirect expression of other domains, ranging from 
cosmology to social structure to ways of classifying the world and its contents. Therefore, 
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apparently irrational beliefs are unproblematic – for the same reason that metaphors are 
not irrational. For example, a more recent ethnographer reinterpreted the Bororo assertion 
reported by von den Steinen in terms of social relations:  
It turns out that (1) only men say ‘we are red macaws;’ (2) red macaws are owned as pets 
by Bororo women: (3) because of matrilineal descent and uxorilocal residence, men are 
in important ways dependent on women; (4) both men and macaws are thought to reach 
beyond the women’s sphere through their contacts with spirits (Crocker, cited in Sperber, 
1982, p. 152) 
 
Symbolist interpretations of apparently irrational beliefs thus appear to be quite plausible; 
yet when attempting to interpret other ‘irrational’ beliefs in the same way, one soon finds 
out that not all such beliefs can be so reduced to other rational meanings. For example, 
the Bororo also state that they can have real contact with spirits, and are quite adamant 
about the literal truth of such statements. Sperber (1982) has proposed an explanation that 
is neither intellectualist nor symbolist, but rationalist and universalist. He noted that 
propositions by themselves cannot be rational or irrational; it is what one does with 
propositions that determines their rationality. It is possible that these ‘apparently 
irrational beliefs’ are unlike other beliefs; in particular, that people have a conscious 
appreciation of an epistemological difference between them and purely factual beliefs. 
Apparently irrational beliefs are believed, but are believed in a different sense from such 
things as “water wets the skin when applied to it.”10 Sperber, in other words, introduces 
the notion that commonly used terms used in ascription, such as thought and belief, may 
refer to a suite of related, but different phenomena. The possibility that different forms of 
beliefs might exist should not be ignored. Anthropologists are understandably drawn to 
unusual, surprising, or counterintuitive utterances; but when they assert that these reflect 
                                                 
10 Sperber further suggests that many apparently irrational beliefs – which can take the form of statements 
such as “god is everywhere” – do not refer to single, well-understood propositions. He uses the term semi-
propositional to refer to those representations that can be plausibly interpreted in different ways within or 
across individuals. 
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a speaker’s beliefs, they risk producing unwarranted ascriptions. Over the years, 
statements like “we are red macaws” have caused observers to ascribe to the speakers the 
properties of irrationality, of limited understanding of the natural world and causality, and 
of symbolic/associative thinking. None of these strategies provides strong evidence that 
the property being ascribed is what is causing the ‘irrational’ utterance to be produced. In 
contrast, an approach like Sperber’s is more psychologically plausible and open to 
empirical confirmation. For example, when people reason about apparently irrational 
beliefs we should expect that their inferential processes be impaired, producing fewer and 
shallower chains of inference; that the products of such inferences be less readily agreed 
upon; and that the holders of these beliefs refer to authority more often.  
  
Intra-Individual Variability, Context Effects, and the Ascription of Belief 
In this section, we argue that ascription can fail because of another way in which the 
common usage of the category of belief is misleading. We start by reviewing empirical 
work that suggests that incompatible representations of a single concept11 may exist in 
the mind and be accessed in different contexts, and we will suggest that to ascribe one 
form of belief when one has evidence of incompatible representations is deceptive.12 In 
the following discussion, we take it for granted that there is value in studying aspects of 
culture in relative isolation. We recognize that this is not an uncontroversial claim. 
Stafford (forthcoming) argues that the uneasy relationship between anthropologists and 
                                                 
11 Here we deal with the simplest case, in which two representations are clearly dissociable. However, we 
cannot exclude that in some instances, even including several of the cases we describe, further 
representations may exist.  
12 It could be argued that the examples we review can be explained in terms of Sperber’s theory, outlined in 
section 3.2. That is, the Bororo could have a dual incompatible representation of the self – one as humans, 
the other as red macaws. While this is indeed possible – and even likely – we treat the cases we look at in 
section 4 separately, because they do not all focus on claims of irrationality.  
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psychologists originates in this very issue, and rightly points out that there is much to be 
learned by looking at many aspects of a culture at once. Here, as in the rest of this paper, 
we have no intention to dismiss anthropological methods altogether, but to suggest that 
the problems that we illustrate in this section can in most cases be circumvented through 
careful use of methods derived from psychology. 
 
Evidence for the existence of incompatible representations 
‘Virgin birth’ among the Australians and Melanesians 
Starting in the late 1800s, ethnographic reports started appearing which purported to 
show that people in some Australian and Melanesian societies lacked knowledge of the 
link between sexual intercourse and procreation (or, in other interpretations, of the sperm 
and egg fertilisation process, and in others still, of physiological paternity). These reports 
provoked widespread discussion in anthropological circles. In an early review Ashley-
Montagu (1937) stated that “by far the largest number of field-workers assert that the 
Australians are ignorant of the relationship between intercourse and childbirth” (p. 176) 
He also noted how contemporary critics either believed that Australians never possessed 
this knowledge, or that they had, but then lost it through the acquisition of new and 
incompatible spiritual beliefs.  
 
Several decades later, Leach (1961; 1966) reignited the debate, partly in response 
to the continued claims of some anthropologists (notably Spiro, 1968) about lack of 
knowledge of physiological paternity among Australians. Leach, in his typically 
impassioned style, presents several strands of evidence for his conviction that Australians 
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and Trobrianders are not ignorant of such facts. First, he notes how Roth, the author of 
the late-18th-century ethnography of the Tully River Blacks that started the controversy, 
reports that his informants freely stated that the cause of pregnancy in animals other than 
humans is indeed copulation. Secondly, Leach refers to more recent ethnography by 
Meggitt, which suggests that context may make a difference to how Walbiri talk about 
conception: “in ritual contexts, men speak of the action of the guruwari (spirit entities) as 
the significant factor; in secular contexts they nominate both the guruwari and sexual 
intercourse. The women, having few ritual attitudes, generally emphasise copulation.” 
Lastly, Leach suggests that Roth’s and other anthropologists’ tendency to attribute 
implausible beliefs to non-Western people is simply a reflection of their beliefs in the 
irrationality of primitive peoples. After all, Westerners also have beliefs about virgin 
birth, but these are imbued with religious significance, and play an insignificant role in 
everyday life; therefore, these ‘untrue’ beliefs about procreation should be interpreted in 
structural terms, as key elements of a cross-culturally recurrent pattern of ideas.   
 
Unfortunately, the evidence is insufficient to allow us to settle the question of 
what Australians and Melanesians actually knew about reproduction.13 But it is possible 
that they had incompatible representations of reproduction in which one version of the 
concepts was used in everyday contexts (for example when talking about non-human 
animals, and possibly in some instances even when talking about humans), while the 
other, akin to religious dogma, was reserved for the ritual context and for answering 
direct questions about the process of social reproduction. Leach seems to intuit this 
                                                 
13 Helpful evidence would include a simple experiment that required people to reason about human 
procreation in unfamiliar contexts. Several of the following illustrations rely on such experiments to argue 
for the existence of incompatible representations.  
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possibility, but he is unable to articulate this in psychological terms because of his 
reliance on the old anthropological notion of belief that Sperber criticizes. We will return 
to the question of belief and rationality at the end of this section, after giving further 
examples of incompatible representations from the anthropological and psychological 
literature. 
 
Understandings of Biological Inheritance among the Vezo  
During her fieldwork in Madagascar, Astuti noted that Vezo adults invoke a variety of 
social mechanisms to account for the physiognomy of their young infants. For example, a 
child might be said to look like someone his mother used to dislike when she was 
pregnant or like someone in whose company she used to spend a lot of time; the infant’s 
appearance might suddenly change because of a spirit’s unwelcome visitation; the birth 
of a baby with a misshapen foot might be explained by the fact that the mother, when still 
a child, used to make fun of a person with a similar handicap; and so on. What is striking 
about these causal accounts is that they all establish the resemblance of infants with 
people who are not biologically related to them. Therefore, based on what they say about 
their children, one could conclude that Vezo adults do not distinguish between social and 
biological causality, as they seemingly ignore the role that procreation plays in the 
transmission of bodily properties from parents to offspring. This conclusion has great 
theoretical relevance for anthropology, because it appears to support the culturalist 
orientation in kinship studies, which claims that people in different cultural traditions 
have radically different understandings of the process of birth and of biological kinship, 
often emphasizing social aspects at the expense of biological ones.  
 68
Yet Vezo adults are also able to articulate a different view of the processes that 
give babies their looks. When asked to reason about the hypothetical adoption of a child 
whose birth parents had died soon after the birth of their son, Vezo adults 
overwhelmingly judged that the adopted child would grow up to have the same bodily 
properties of his birth parents, while sharing the beliefs, skills and customs of his 
adoptive parents (see Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; and Bloch, Solomon, & Carey, 
2001, for further details). Vezo informants thus articulated different representations of the 
process of procreation and reproduction and of the link that exists between parents and 
their offspring. Crucially, the biological representation is articulated when people reason 
inferentially about fictional kinship relations. In contrast, when people are engaged in 
social life, they tend to articulate the non-biological view. By claiming that infants 
resemble those who are not biologically related to them, people manage to extend and 
stretch kinship relations well beyond the boundaries of biological kinship.  
 
Understandings of Non-Human Life Forms among the Ma’ Betisék 
Karim (1981) reports that the Ma’ Betisék of Malaysia hold a belief system about plants 
and non-human animals and their relation to humans that contains two irreconcilable 
views. The first, expressed by the concept of tulah (curse), refers to the idea that plants 
and animals, having been cursed by the ancestors, are fit for human consumption. The 
second, expressed by the concept of kemali’ (tabooed object), refers to the idea that “acts 
involving the killing and destruction of plants and animals bring humans misfortune and 
death because both plant and animal life are derived from, and are essentially similar to, 
human life” (p. 1). As in the Vezo case, Tulah and kemali’ ideas are often relegated to 
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specific contexts – the former appearing more frequently when people engage in 
economic activities, the latter in ritual ones. 
 
Understanding of God among US Students 
Barrett and Keil (1996) found a discrepancy between the way US college students 
thought about God when asked directly and while engaged in recall tasks. As the authors 
expected, participants explicitly represented God as possessing a number of non-
anthropomorphic properties such as omnipotence, omnipresence, infinity, non-materiality 
– in accordance to current theological principles. However, when asked to recall and 
paraphrase stories, they attributed more anthropomorphic traits to God; for example, they 
tended to imagine God as moving very swiftly from place to place rather than being 
everywhere at the same time. This example suggests that the non-anthropomorphic 
properties that people learn and explicitly maintain to be characteristic of God are not 
easily accessible when performing moderately taxing cognitive tasks.   
 
Self Construal among Westerners 
Psychologists Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991) have argued for a cultural 
tendency to construe and perceive the self as more or less interdependent, or connected to 
other members of one’s group. They have also suggested that different patterns of self-
construal prevail regionally, and in particular that the Japanese and other East Asians rate 
high on the interdependence scale, while Americans of European descent rate low. More 
recently, a large number of studies have shown that forms of self construal appear to 
affect other aspects of cognition, such as categorization, inductive reasoning, etc. (Knight 
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& Nisbett, in press; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Yet, 
regardless of their broad cultural patterning and wide cognitive impact, these conceptions 
of the self have also been found not to be fully stable within cultures. Gardner, Gabriel, & 
Lee (1999) showed that it is possible to make European-Americans answer questions 
about social values in a more interdependent manner if they are subtly primed beforehand 
by having to circle plural (rather than singular) pronouns in a text, as part of an unrelated 
reading task. The effect found by Gardner et al, while not invalidating the findings of 
Markus & Kitayama (1991), shows that the cross-cultural differences may be best 
explained by the culturally-influenced preferential adoption of a cognitive style. This 
hypothesis is both plausible, because it does not require radically different cognitive 
endowment at birth (which, though not advocated by Markus and Kitayama, could not be 
ruled out through their results), and interesting for anthropologists, because it offers a 
way of explaining cultural variability. More to the point, it shows once again that people 
can hold contrasting and incompatible representations of the same concept – in this case, 
the self – and deploy them in different contexts.  
 
Theories of Incompatible Representations and their Relation to Ascription 
In the above examples, the context in which a concept is deployed was shown to have an 
effect on the way it was represented. The role of context in shaping behaviour is a 
popular topic in psychology (see for example Darley & Batson, 1973; Ross & Nisbett, 
1991), but the possibility of concepts being represented and deployed in radically 
different ways according to context is relatively understudied. This possibility 
significantly affects the practice of ascription. Statements to the effect that: 
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- Australians and Melanesians believe that there is no link between sexual intercourse 
and procreation;  
- The Vezo believe that bodily properties are socially transmitted;  
- The Ma’ Betisék believe that the animals and plants are human-like and therefore 
unfit for human consumption;  
- European-Americans believe God to be omnipresent and the self to be an independent 
and bounded entity 
are not erroneous. However, they are incomplete, because they fail to mention that 
virtually opposite forms of these beliefs are held by the same individuals and deployed in 
certain contexts.  
 
It is true that anthropological terms such as “contested” and “negotiated”, 
routinely used to qualify the nature of ascribed meanings and beliefs, are evidence of an 
intuitive appreciation of the problems of belief ascription. However, such terms rarely 
carry with them the precision necessary to do justice to this particular phenomenon. The 
need for a change in language is clear, but exactly what sort of change is needed depends 
on a full understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of incompatible representations. 
 
While we are still far from such an understanding, contemporary theories of 
concepts offer some clues. It has often been assumed that concepts are represented by 
linguistic (or language-like) lists or networks of features. These feature lists are thought 
to be instantiated in a non-linguistic form in the brain. A closely related and widely 
accepted assumption is that concepts are context-independent – the representation of the 
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concept of chair, for instance, includes features such as has legs, is used to sit on, and so 
forth, but excludes such information as where a chair is usually found. Some 
psychologists, however, disagree. Lawrence Barsalou and his colleagues (Barsalou, 1982; 
Barsalou, 2002; Barsalou et al., 1993; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006) have argued that concepts 
are mentally represented by a combination of generic and episodic information. 
Furthermore, they have challenged a fundamental assumption of category learning, that 
the cognitive system collects shared features of concepts while discarding information 
about the situations in which one is likely to encounter the concepts. According to 
Barsalou, background information of this sort is stored along with feature information, 
and influences performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. The information that is 
relevant for a concept varies depending on the goal of the situation. For example, Barclay 
et al. (1974) presented participants with a series of sentences containing the same word 
(e.g., piano) in different contexts. Some of the sentences stressed one feature of the target 
word (e.g., The man lifted the piano), and some another (e.g., The man tuned the piano). 
After studying the sentences, participants were asked to recall them, and were given cue 
words to help recall. Sentence recall was significantly better when cues were related to 
the situation-specific concept of the target word (e.g., heavy, for the first example) than 
when they were related to the target word but not to the situation (e.g., has a nice sound, 
for the first example).  
 
Barsalou and colleagues’ proposal offers a very general explanation for the sort of 
phenomena we are describing. However, the situated cognition model needs some 
modifications if it is to be used to explain our examples of incompatible representations. 
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Whereas the features of the piano evoked in different contexts in Barclay et al.’s 
experiment are not contradictory (it is easy to state that a piano is both heavy and sounds 
nice in the same sentence) the features of the cases we describe above are always so (it is 
harder to state that sexual intercourse does and does not play a role in procreation at the 
same time). In other words, while it is true that a certain situation may cause participants 
to be more attentive to certain features at the expense of others, in the examples we 
outlined above situations seem to cause participants to attribute to concepts certain 
features in one situation and their opposites in another. By analogy, we should be able to 
devise a situation in which people readily attributed the feature of absolute lightness to a 
piano – that, however, does not seem plausible.  
 
This issue should not induce us to believe that incompatible representation is not 
explainable within the framework of situated cognition. It is possible that the set of 
incompatible representations we looked at form a subset of all instances of situated 
cognition, characterized by this peculiar context-dependent denial or affirmation of 
features. We give two arguments to support this suggestion, one psychological and 
proximate, the other anthropological and ultimate.  
 
First, current psychological models of semantic memory can provide a simple 
implementation of the process of incompatible representation. Network theories of 
semantic memory suggest that incompatible representations may not require specialized 
psychological machinery. Memorized concepts are generally believed to be roughly 
instantiated in network form, with a central node and several associated properties 
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instantiated as links to other nodes. Each of the links that connects central and peripheral 
nodes is weighted; that is, it is more or less strongly associated with the concept. The 
number and weight of links attached to each concept vary according to social, cultural, 
and individual factors. Some concepts are linked to a number of attributes in complex 
ways; different contexts may cause the weights to alter so that some properties become 
more strongly activated and others less so. If we think of concepts as network 
representations with a weighted set of properties, it becomes possible to sketch a basic 
psychological model of how incompatible representations may be processed in the brain. 
The properties of concepts with incompatible representations could be grouped into two 
(or more) mutually exclusive subsets. When a certain context causes a significant number 
of the members of the first subset to fire, members of the other subset stop firing and 
become inhibited, and vice versa. The difference between incompatible and normal 
representation could, therefore, be merely quantitative. 
 
But this account of process is insufficient; we also need to ask why incompatible 
representations should exist at all, where ordinary cognitive tasks can be tackled with 
little effort by the situated cognition model. Maurice Bloch (1989a; 1989b) has suggested 
that anthropologists’ fascination with rituals and the ritual context has often obscured 
their understanding of other, more mundane ways of conceptualizing the world that take 
place outside of that context and in many ways contradict it. Non-ritual ways of thinking 
about the world are based in humans’ (evolved) cognitive capacities interacting with, and 
developing in, a varied social and ecological environment. Yet anthropologists have been 
singularly reluctant to talk about non-ritual cognition, perhaps because it is less obviously 
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variable across cultures (and thus less ‘visible’), or perhaps because of a vested 
disciplinary interest in emphasizing difference. Bloch (1989b) has suggested many 
several anthropological claims about ways of experiencing and understanding the world 
presented as being peculiar to certain societies (such the non-durational concept of time 
that Geertz ascribes to the Balinese) are indeed incomplete. What they show is not the 
existence of radically different ways of conceptualizing the world, but rather the fact that 
people in different cultures will use in the ritual context versions of some everyday 
concepts, ideas, etc. that are incompatible with their everyday use. In another paper, 
Bloch (1989a) has also proposed that the products of cognition in the ritual context be 
termed ‘ideology.’ Cognition in the ritual context is only explainable with reference to 
the process of political domination. The practice of ritual creates images of society that 
contradict everyday understandings of it; these images are endorsed by those who hold 
the power, and serve both to legitimate power and to “mystify, invert and hide the real 
conditions of existence” (Bloch, 1989a, p. 130). 
 
The everyday/ritual distinction seems to provide a prima facie explanation for 
most of the cases of incompatible representation we outlined above. It is also 
psychologically plausible, in that it underscores the role of cognitive effort in dealing 
with certain concepts or, more accurately, with certain ways of representing concepts. 
Cognition in the ritual context seems to be more expensive – affording fewer and 
shallower inferences, etc. This is not surprising; after all, Bloch’s argument is an 
evolutionary one, suggesting that the mechanisms used in non-ritual contexts are better 
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suited for the majority of mental activity, which happens to take place in the everyday, 
non-ritual context.  
 
However, it appears that not all cases of incompatible representation can be 
mapped on an everyday/ritual context shift. Take for example the shift between 
independent and interdependent views of the self that Gardner et al. (1999) demonstrated. 
This phenomenon does not appear to be dependent on ideology and the ritual context. 
Both views of the self are equally ontologically plausible and philosophically defensible; 
both are emphasized in US culture. This suggests two alternative interpretations. On the 
one hand, it may be that what we are calling incompatible representations are a 
psychologically unitary phenomenon, which in some (or even in most) cases can be 
explained in terms of Bloch’s theory. Cases such as the representations of the self could 
simply be less typical exemplars. On the other hand, it may be that incompatible 
representations are only superficially similar phenomena with different psychological 
underpinnings. From the few instances of context-dependent incompatible 
representations that have been described by anthropologists and psychologists, it is 
difficult to choose between these two alternatives. 
 
Conclusions 
In the course of this paper, we have noted several problems with ascription as it has been 
practised in anthropology. We would like to emphasize once again that ascription is a 
given of anthropological writing, in many ways unavoidable, and in a large number of 
cases even beneficial to understanding. Collective ascription that is justified and well 
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supported is an excellent way to present data in a compact and easily interpretable way. 
Therefore, we have chosen to focus on cases where the common language of ascription is 
an inappropriate way of presenting evidence. Some of these cases have been successfully 
addressed by anthropologists. With the knowledge we now have about how ideas, beliefs, 
skills, expertise and so forth are unevenly distributed within social groups, careless 
claims – common only a few decades ago – that the x do or believe y (Jones, 2005) have 
become harder to defend, and fallen out of favour among anthropologists (although they 
remain popular in everyday language). But the ascription of cognitive properties without 
sufficient justification is still practised in anthropology. The discipline’s ambitious 
(though not universally shared) aim to be a science of humankind means that 
practitioners of other, more strictly bounded and epistemologically uniform disciplines 
will often take issue with the methodology, theoretical orientation, or form of evidence 
presentation of anthropologists – this much is unavoidable, and should not necessarily 
discourage anthropologists from attempting to answer big questions. Yet to make strong 
claims about cognition without engaging with psychologists and other cognitive scientists 
is not defensible, and ultimately counterproductive, as parts of anthropology become 
liable to be taken over by related fields.  
  
A different problem arises from our description of recent findings that suggest 
that concepts may be deployed in context-specific, incompatible forms. This is a more 
difficult issue, since there is no consensus in psychology and allied disciplines as to the 
cognitive underpinnings of these phenomena. Until a mapping of their domain and 
explanation of their psychological nature are available, anthropologists would be well 
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advised to consider contextual effects on representation, and to temper strong ascriptions 
of belief in the light of the cross-cultural evidence reviewed here.
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Some Cognitive Origins of Cultural Order
 
The origins of thought are paradoxical. To some uncertain degree, thought is a product of 
one’s cultural environment and historical situation. But the cultural environment and 
historical situation are themselves imaginal, products of thought processes. 
Anthropological theory has been rife with attempts, some more plausible than others, to 
establish some kind of mapping between mind and culture. Emile Durkheim 
(1995[1912]) famously declared the independence of the social from the psychological – 
while in the same breath positing a simple identity between psychological and social 
states. Other early theorists, most famously Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1923), tried to derive an 
understanding of individual mental processes from cultural stories and practices. The 
ensuing years saw more sophisticated ideas emerge as anthropologists worked with 
improved ethnographic techniques and more developed psychological theory. 
Contemporary cognitive anthropology reflects the great progress both anthropology and 
psychology have made in the last century. Yet the paradox is not dissolved, nor do we 
expect it to be: culture and mind are irreducible terms. 
  
Still, the relation between culture and cognition is much better understood than it 
used to be, and has progressed from a simple aporia to a research problem. The 
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paradoxical nature of the problem has led to a bifurcation of theoretical emphases in 
cognitive anthropology. One line of thought, represented by Roy D’Andrade’s (1987) 
studies of folk models of the mind, Naomi Quinn’s (1996; Strauss & Quinn, 1997) 
studies of US Americans’ models of marriage, and Claudia Strauss’s (1990; Strauss & 
Quinn, 1997) studies of US Americans’ ideas about economic individualism, has 
emphasized the mechanisms by which individuals acquire and represent cultural models. 
A second line of thought, represented by Scott Atran’s studies of folkbiology (1990) and 
religion (2002), Pascal Boyer’s (1994; 2001) study of religious representations, Lawrence 
Hirschfeld’s work on kinship (1986; 1989) and race categories (1996), and Maurice 
Bloch’s (1998; Bloch & Sperber, 2002) work on memory, language, and kinship has 
explored the ways in which cognitive predispositions favour the reproduction of some 
cultural representations over others. Broadly, the first of these lines emphasizes the 
malleability of cognition, treating local cultures as fixed patterns (or sets of patterns) that 
individual minds absorb. The second line of thought treats cognition as a fixed set of 
predispositions that shapes cultures over generations of cultural transmission. Neither 
perspective denies the validity of the other – both are patently necessary. But even 
together they are incomplete. 
  
Both lines of theory focus on cultural and cognitive representations. But culture 
and cognition are dynamic, as much process as substance, and in this article we outline a 
mapping between cognitive processes and dynamic cultural patterns. We argue that some 
kinds of cultural patterns – kinds that have been repeatedly observed by ethnographers in 
many places – can be understood as the operation of dynamic cognitive processes 
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documented by psychologists. Specifically, we will argue that the (partial) systematicity 
of cultures, the recurrence of distinctions across conceptual domains, and the conceptual 
‘bleeding’ of symbols are the products of basic principles – basic processes – of cognitive 
functioning. 
  
The present argument has some limitations the reader should note. First of all, we 
aim to explain patterns that have commonly been presupposed, without explanation, in 
definitions and characterizations of culture. We assume here that there really are patterns 
of action and social interaction that can be called culture, and that ethnographers have 
gone some considerable way toward identifying those patterns. We shall clarify what we 
mean by cultural order below, but for the moment let us note only that we do not think 
analyses purporting to show cultural disorder have shown any such thing, and certainly 
not enough to vitiate the many quality ethnographies done in anthropology’s classical 
period. Our aim here is to build on earlier findings, and therefore we shall settle for 
indicating the kinds of patterns we have in mind by reference to classic ethnographies, 
rather than attempting to argue them as if we were discovering them anew. 
  
Secondly, our intent is explanatory rather than interpretive or critical. Explanation 
is, epistemologically, the most valuable kind of theory because explanatory theories – at 
least successful ones – do the most to broaden our knowledge. Their breadth is also their 
vulnerability, making them open both to different kinds of empirical falsification and to 
charges of incoherence with other knowledge. Our goal is precisely to establish a bridge 
between previously unrelated areas of knowledge, in the hope that the connection will 
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open the door to further investigations; a goal of this sort is best served by an explanatory 
argument. 
  
Finally, the present argument is necessarily abstract. We discuss here general 
patterns of organization of thought and behaviour, and there is no way to discuss such 
things in purely concrete terms. Yet the abstraction has to do only with our subject 
matter, not with the rather simple logic of our argument, and we have provided, we hope, 
enough examples to convey what we have in mind. 
 
Culture and Cognition 
The problem of culture, as we see it, is one of order. To throw the problem of cultural 
order into sharp relief, let us adopt – for the time being – Dan Sperber’s epidemiology-of-
beliefs perspective on culture (e.g., Sperber, 1985b; Sperber, 1996). In Sperber’s 
framework, mental representations (variously constructed as ideas, beliefs, etc.) and 
public representations (public events like gestures, utterances, or writings) become part of 
a population’s culture if they are highly recurrent in that population. Ideas are more or 
less “cultural” depending on how many minds, in a given population, have them. 
 
In this minimal definition, a culture consists in the co-occurrence of ideas in a 
population: if a large portion of the population has the notion of bedroom slippers and 
also the notion of bologna, then these two ideas are part of that population’s culture. No 
connection between these ideas is presupposed: the ideas may be psychologically or 
semantically connected – as in hierarchies of concepts or semantic networks – but they 
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need not be. They need only recur across minds to be part of culture. Sperber thus 
identifies culture with a particular kind of order – the semantic resemblance between the 
contents of individual minds in a population. 
 
Neither Sperber nor we prejudge the causes of this resemblance. Indeed, we 
expect that the causes vary widely, from purely architectural features of human cognition, 
to environmental regularities, to the activities of institutions – and perhaps most often to 
various combinations thereof. To give one example of the first type of cause, human 
memory performs best when dealing with specific sorts of input. Several aspects of 
cultural products affect their chances of being learned, stored, recalled, and transmitted. 
As predicted by Boyer’s (1994; 2001) cognitive theory of religion, it has been found that 
concepts that are minimally counterintuitive (that is, different from everyday concepts in 
strange or unexpected ways, but not altogether bizarre) show the least amount of 
degradation in recall accuracy (Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006; 
Owsianiecki, Upal, Slone, & Tweney, Forthcoming); this, among other things, facilitates 
the spread of religious ideas in a population. While this article focuses on causes of this 
first kind, decades of anthropological work have provided evidence for the two latter 
types. 
  
One property of culture that comes with this Sperberian definition for free, as it 
were, is its scalability: because culture is defined by distributional rather than ontological 
criteria, it is assumed that ideas will vary across populations, across groups within a 
population, and even across individuals within a group – there need be no special 
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explanation for cultural variation. Cultural variation is (at most, for some variation is 
functional variation, itself a kind of order) a step or two in the direction of disorder, the 
unrealized limiting case being a population in which the contents of one mind reveal 
absolutely nothing about the contents of any other minds in the population. On this view, 
the opposite of culture is not, as has sometimes been suggested, variation, but variation 
that is random with respect to the social environment. Blood types display this latter kind 
of variation; the pattern of distribution of blood types within a population is not 
correlated with sociocultural factors, and as such it is uninteresting to anthropologists.14 
Imagine we were to take any society and divide its population into groups based on blood 
types. Such groups would not tell us anything about their members culture – that is, 
group membership would not correlate with any meaningful social or cultural factors. 
The cultural variation within the blood-type groups will be equal to the cultural variation 
between them. 
  
We have adopted the Sperberian definition of culture as a heuristic because it 
casts into sharp relief some other kinds of order in which we are interested. Specifically, 
it allows us to investigate the super-individual, synchronic cultural patterns 
anthropologists have frequently noted. We would not object to others preferring a 
different definition of culture. Nothing in our argument depends on Sperber’s definition: 
we adopt it solely because it clarifies the phenomena we wish to explain – our interest is 
                                                 
14 This is not to say that, once such unevenly distributed properties are discovered they cannot be exploited 
as the basis of folk theories of their significance. For example, in Japan and other Asian countries, a theory 
that predicts personality from blood type is very popular; in Nazi Germany, certain blood types were 
interpreted as racial markers. Naturally, such phenomena are interesting to anthropologists.  
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in specific cultural phenomena, and these remain however culture is defined. What 
matters is that these cultural phenomena can be mapped to cognitive processes.  
 
Cognition, as much as culture, is a tendentious word, so if we are to invoke 
cognitive processes to explain cultural phenomena, we must be quite clear about what we 
mean by it. Following early Chomsky (1957) and the other major thinkers of the 
cognitive revolution (e.g., Bateson, 1972), we understand cognition to be an information-
processing account of the activities of the human mind. Underlying this approach is 
psychologists’ discovery that many of our mental activities are organized by their 
information-processing functions, and that information processing really is the key to 
understanding much of the mind. 
 
Anthropologists (and, recently, cultural psychologists—see for example Cole, 
1996; Nisbett, 2003) have shown convincingly that there are important differences in 
information processing across cultures. Minds are malleable at more than a surface level. 
But our appeal here will be to some of the deepest operating principles of mind, those 
that enable an individual’s adaptation to his or her environment, including the principled 
acquisition of local ways of thinking and feeling. At present there is no evidence that 
these vary, and reason to believe they are part of our biological inheritance as a species. 
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Three Cultural Phenomena and their Cognitive Sources 
1.1 Cultural Systems 
A Sperberian definition of culture allows that cultures might be mere aggregates of ideas 
(practices, meanings, etc.), but many anthropologists (e.g., Geertz, 1973) go further and 
attribute to cultures some kind of systematicity. Systematicity has been a touchy subject 
in anthropology for some time now, owing partly to anthropologists’ recognition that 
cultural order and coherence have sometimes been products of domination – indeed, 
sometimes even the ethnographic recording of particular bits of cultural order (or 
particular kinds of variation) has amounted to a political act. Yet the counterclaim, that 
there is no systematicity to culture, is hardly plausible, and studies in linguistic 
anthropology show how cultural patterns emerge even from individual conversations (cf. 
Tedlock & Mannheim, 1995). The remaining, and larger, problem is how to characterize 
it, and in this anthropologists have sometimes turned to a linguistic analogy. 
 
The notion of a cultural or symbolic “grammar” is sometimes used to capture the 
systematic nature of cultures. Roger Keesing, for example, invokes the notion of a 
symbolic grammar, and the phenomenon it is intended to describe, in a particularly clear 
way (1982:214f.): 
I noted earlier. . .the temptations for kin groups to try to simplify and reduce 
periods of sacredness and the taboos and ritual sequences they entail. In these and 
other ways, and simply by error and failure in the transmission of lore and 
variations in personal style and knowledge, small changes are being introduced 
into local groups. Individuals – all individuals – are in small ways changing and 
contributing to “the system.” But this process of corner-cutting, error, 
convenience, and style would seem to erode structures as well as preserve them. 
We can think of a kind of informational or behavioral entropy at work in the way 
individuals apply and modify the cumulated ways of the group. How, then, are 
order and coherence maintained? Where do the new forms that conform to 
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existing structures, even render them more elegant, come from? For the Kwaio, 
my data strongly suggest that despite continual small and local shifts in 
procedure, structural coherence and the overall order of the symbolic grammar are 
maintained across generations largely because of the impress of expertise, 
construed as ancestral will. 
 
Keesing here describes the structure of culture as a “symbolic grammar,” and suggests 
that the grammar is maintained by expertise, which partly countervails a natural tendency 
toward entropy. 
 
Keesing does not invoke cultural grammar as an explanation of cultural order, but 
only as a description of it – the relation between cultural behaviour and cultural grammar 
is thus different from the relationship between linguistic behaviour and linguistic 
grammar. And there are problems with this metaphor: John Gatewood (1998) argues that 
because anthropologists have repeatedly found that behaviour is not rigorously 
segmentable, the notion of a cultural grammar makes little sense. We agree, but there are 
compelling reasons to believe that thought is in fact segmentable at many levels – as we 
will see below – so we do not regard Gatewood’s as a fatal criticism. 
 
Whatever the problems with “cultural grammars” as theoretical constructs, the 
basic observation underlying the notion remains: the ideas and practices found in 
societies seem to have an internal logic to them, and thus systematicity is a real property 




In saying that cultures are systematic we do not adopt the extreme claims (still 
found in introductory textbooks) that cultures are integrated wholes. Although there are 
no a priori reasons that cultures could not be highly integrated entities with clearly 
defined borders, in reality such claims have never been strongly empirically supported. 
Not only has there never been evidence of integration at this level, but there is no social 
or psychological mechanism yet discovered that would generate such a pattern. Even a 
process of ideational (practical, semantic, etc.) variation and selection in an isolated 
population would not necessarily produce thoroughgoing cultural integration. Work 
showing that cultural signifiers are frequently indeterminate and negotiated, subject to the 
often-conflicting interests of their recruiters, is merely the latest nail in the coffin of an 
implausible claim. 
 
Yet there is ample evidence that subsets of cultural ideas are connected by a 
variety of logical, causal, predictive, and practical relations – indeed, one can hardly read 
ethnography without seeing all of these kinds of connections between ideas (practices, 
meanings, etc.) at play. It is in fact lower-level conventions – especially tacit agreements 
about communication – that enable more abstract cultural signifiers to be negotiated: such 
negotiations can take place only within a defined framework if interlocutors are to 
understand each others’ bids at all. 
 
We think culture to be not an integrated whole (i.e., a unified system without 
tensions and contradictions) but rather a series of internally coherent systems. These 
systems – for the classification of animals, performing a sacrifice, gossiping, and so forth 
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– are socially shared, although they are not usually identical from one individual to the 
next (Strauss & Quinn, 1997). Different cultural systems intersect in the individual, who 
acquires a great number of them in enculturation. Each system is internally coherent, a 
model or tool for thinking about some domain, but different systems may contradict each 
other, and in this they serve as a repertoire or resource that an individual may put to his or 
her own ends. 
 
This more modest version of cultural order remains an anthropological problem. 
A Sperberian definition of culture allows that ideas might merely co-occur without any 
connection between them, and casts into sharp relief the fact that many cultural ideas 
enjoy some degree of coherence with others. This systematicity requires an explanation, 
some kind of process or mechanism that could produce such interconnected pools of local 
order. 
 
1.2. Cognitive Source: Relevance Theory 
The explanation of cultural systematicity requires some kind of process that either creates 
new connections, thus filling in gaps between otherwise unrelated culture elements, or 
preferentially reproduces those culture elements that happen to be connected, in some 
way, to others.15 Although both kinds of processes are part of normal human cognition, 
scientists’ understanding of the first is extremely fragmentary, and so we shall focus on 
the preferential reproduction of systematic ideas. Fortunately, psychologists have 
                                                 
15 One might also postulate, of course, that cultural elements are only invented and “published” in an 
already systematized form. While we think it likely that this does account for some cultural systematicity, it 
cannot account for many of the patterns in which ethnographers have been most interested, and at present it 
is not possible to say much about it. 
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excellent reason to believe that human cognition is biased toward systematic 
representations, a bias that is summed up in Sperber & Wilson’s (1995) cognitive 
principle of relevance. 
 
The cognitive principle of relevance states, briefly, that human cognition is geared 
to the maximization of effects for the expenditure of effort, to getting the most 
informational bang for its energetic buck. Experimental evidence for this operating 
principle is growing (Van der Henst, Carles, & Sperber, 2002; Van der Henst & Sperber, 
2004), but some principle of this kind is implied in all cognitive models of learning (cf.  
Holland, 1992; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). In order for the mind to 
sort out the implications of its environment, it must have some system for ranking 
different sets of inferences in order of processing priority, and cognitive effect is the most 
general ranking principle.  
 
Applied to individual thought the cognitive principle of relevance states that, 
ceteris paribus, people will attend more to inferences with relatively greater cognitive 
effects than to those with relatively smaller cognitive effects, with the entailment that the 
greater an inference’s connectivity to other ideas and the stronger those connections, the 
more cognitive resources will be allocated to its processing. Individual human thought 
will, therefore, tend to favour representations that are systematized more than those that 
are less so. 
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In application to communication, this implies that, ceteris paribus, people will 
attend more to those messages that connect to their existing ideas, that have ramifications 
for their mental models of the world, than to those that do not. Sperber and Wilson, 
following Grice (1989), suggest that communicators who want to have their message 
heard implicitly recognize this and usually adjust their message accordingly. Not only are 
cognitively integrated messages more likely to be heard, they are also more likely to be 
voiced. 
 
The implications of this principle for the study of culture are enormous. If much 
of culture is communicative – and it is (Leach, 1954) – then we would expect cultures to 
tend toward systematicity. In a society where individual minds were completely random 
with respect to the social environment, we would expect that people would attend to 
those messages that resonate with the contents of their individual minds, and that 
consequently such relevant messages would spread more quickly across the population 
than messages that did not resonate with existing ideas. Within a short time, we would 
expect not only that culture – convergence among the mental representations in a society 
– would emerge but also that the emergent culture would be considerably systematic. 
 
Thus the simple but profound cognitive principle of relevance can explain the 
emergence of systematic properties in culture. The systemic properties that emerge from 
the independent operation of individual, systematizing minds are not necessarily global or 
coherent the way early anthropologists envisioned. Because cultural patterns must bubble 
up from individual interactions before propagating across a society, we may expect to 
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find patterns at all scales, from the intimate habits of a pair of lovers to socially global 
properties such as dead metaphors and other stock idioms. The extent of any particular 
cultural pattern cannot therefore be stipulated or presumed, but must be investigated 
empirically. Some kinds of patterns, however, are more likely than others, and in the next 
two sections we will investigate two particularly common kinds of order. 
 
2.1. Cross-Domain Correspondences 
Ethnographers have long noted that communities often use a small set of distinctions 
repeatedly, across a variety of semantic, conceptual, and practical domains, to capture 
what are locally perceived as correspondences across these domains. Over the years, 
there have been many attempts at systematizing and finding commonalities among these 
cross-culturally recurrent strategies. Among these attempts, Ortner (1973) lists the 
following: cultural themes (Benedict), integrative concepts and dominant values 
(DuBois), dominant orientations (Kluckhohn), dominant symbols (Turner), and core 
symbols (Schneider). Ortner places herself in the same tradition as the above authors in 
her discussion of ‘key symbols.’ In her formulation, symbols are ‘vehicles for cultural 
meaning’ (p. 1339). Key symbols are those symbols that have the most cultural salience, 
in terms of how frequently they are invoked, of how much elaboration they show, and of 
how many contexts they appear in.  
 
A second strand of anthropological enquiry has dealt with a particular kind of 
recurrent distinctions: dual organization. Many societies, regardless of scale, divide 
themselves into moieties; one’s moiety affiliation often determines one’s residence, one’s 
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range of potential partners, and one’s power relationship with others. But dual 
organization often extends beyond social organization, to cosmology, art, and folk 
philosophy. The fact that dual social divisions are found on every continent prompted 
early anthropologists to speculate that they are a primitive form of social organization, 
and that the tendency of members of many cultures (even non-dualistic ones) to engage in 
dualistic thinking ultimately derives from them. In contrast, Lévi-Strauss (1963 [1956]) 
proposed that dual social organization is a result, rather than a cause, of dualistic 
thinking. Since then, anthropologists have devoted a lot of attention to the study of dual 
organization and dualistic thought. Simple oppositional binarisms, such as male-female, 
right-left, and pure-polluted, are among the most commonly used (and most frequently 
studied) cross-domain distinctions worldwide (see e.g. the papers in Maybury-Lewis & 
Almagor, 1989; Needham, 1973). Roy Rappaport (1984 [1968]), for example, observed 
that the Tsembaga Maring used a hot/dry/hard (romba-nda) vs. cold/wet/soft (kinim) 
distinction to describe differences between pairs of items in vastly different domains, 
such as ritually prepared warriors and women; physical strength and fertility; upper body 
and lower body; land-only animals and animals associated with water; food and drink; 
and red spirits (hot), a female spirit (kun kaze ambra, cold), and spirits of the lowlands 
(cold).16 
 
                                                 
16 Although Rappaport notes that the Tsembaga Maring regard these as opposing principles, he leaves 
ambiguous how static or dynamic these classifications may be. Frequently he reports that x is regarded as 
“hot” without specifying precisely what –x, its “cold” opposite, is. Therefore it is possible that some terms 
presented as opposites here are in fact missing a third term: for example, the full distinction between 
ritually prepared warriors and women might be ritually prepared warriors : [men] :: [men] : women – but 
the bracketed term is not discussed by Rappaport. Rappaport also does not indicate whether his informants’ 
use of the hot-cold opposition reflects an underlying catalogue of opposites or only a rough-and-ready 
distinction applied as conversationally appropriate. These ambiguities, however, do not vitiate his 
observation that the Tsembaga Maring use classifications as described above. 
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A third perspective on cross-domain correspondences comes from outside 
anthropology. George Lakoff, a linguist, and Mark Johnson, a philosopher, have 
proposed that metaphor, rather than being an inconsequential characteristic of language, 
is a way of organizing the ordinary conceptual system – they argue that “the essence of 
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:5).  
 
We would argue that the three approaches we just described, in spite of their 
different foci, essentially point to a single phenomenon: the recurrent use of distinctions 
across different domains. Often the distinctions are dichotomous; sometimes they are 
polytomous. Their significance, the patterns of rights, duties, and permissions that they 
reveal, and the image of the world that they embody vary from one society to the next. 
Yet in every culture some distinctions are used in ways that cross conceptual, semantic, 
and practical boundaries. 
 
From an epidemiology-of-beliefs perspective, this level of cultural organization is 
quite unexpected: there is no a priori reason to expect that from the aggregation of ideas 
in a community there will emerge such large-scale patterns. The use of these distinctions 
in such a variety of domains, each with its own behavioral implications, suggests that the 
contrast is drawn in a form that it is not readily used in communication, or even 
verbalized at all. Rather, Tsembaga infer, as did Rappaport, the nature (and limits) of this 
distinction from the variety of contexts in which it is used. It is presently an open 
anthropological question how such distinctions arise. 
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2.2. Cognitive Source: Decomposition 
Our second cognitive principle is that of decomposition, the cognitive strategy of 
breaking processes down into their component elements, each of which is handled by 
dedicated cognitive mechanisms: the processing of a visual object’s identity, for example, 
is handled by a different mental subsystem than is the object’s location. The enormous 
variety of neural deficit (Gardner, 1985) and experimental studies (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 
1994) attest to the mind’s tendency to parcel out different aspects of a task to different 
mechanisms. As a consequence of the cognitive principle of decomposition, the mind is 
best viewed as bundles within bundles of task-specific microprocessors.17 
   
Interaction between the principle of decomposition and the principle of relevance 
yields a mind in which the specialized sub-processors may be used for a wide variety of 
problems that seem, on a surface level, to have little in common. For example, the theory 
of mind mechanism – the specialized cognitive mechanism used to interpret other 
people’s states of mind – is used not only in interactions with other people, but in reading 
texts, and in thinking about computers, nations, and all sorts of non-human animals. 
These kinds of problems have nothing obvious in common, but notions of understanding 
and intent are useful cognitive tools for making sense of them. One might say, with 
                                                 
17 Those familiar with psychological literature will recognize the similarity between our principle of 
decomposition and notions of modularity (structural or functional) and domain specificity. We have chosen 
the more general, but more precise, notion of decomposition rather than either of these terms because 
claims about modularity and domain specificity often conflate a variety of issues—innateness, anatomical 
distinctiveness, relation to semantics—which need not burden our argument, and because the arguments 
between connectionists and modularity advocates are irrelevant to the present argument, because 
connectionist networks decompose the computational components of the processes they perform. 
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Daniel Dennett (1987), that the theory of mind is a very powerful mental heuristic, even 
when applied to entities that cannot really be said to have minds. 
  
We suggest that this is how cross-domain distinctions should be understood. 
Distinctions are conceptual tools, and, while they may be expressed as opposing terms, 
they often seem to involve further dimensions of contrast not obviously related to the 
terms they use. The calculation of cross-domain distinctions is a computational process, 
used for a variety of problems that may not have anything obvious in common. When the 
Tsembaga Maring used a hot/dry/hard (romba-nda) vs. cold/wet/soft (kinim) distinction 
to describe differences between ritually prepared warriors and women, strength and 
fertility, upper body and lower body, land-only animals and animals associated with 
water, food and drink, it may not be because there is any obvious resemblance between 
hotness, warriors, strength, land-only animals, and food – there is not, or at least not more 
than between hotness, women, fertility, and land-only animals. Rather, we suggest, the 
same computational process that serves, along with others, to distinguish cold and hot is 
also employed, along with different others, to distinguish women from men and, along 
with still others, to distinguish animals associated with water from those that live on land 
only. What precise computational elements these distinctions share we cannot say 
without further investigation, nor can we be sure that an ethnographer could hit upon 
precisely the same tool as native informants. What we can say is that the recurrence of 
distinctions is not surprising, given the principles of decomposition and relevance, and 
we suggest that these operating principles of the mind explain why there is a general 
phenomenon of cross-domain distinctions. Of course, more specific explanations would 
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be required to account for specific distinctions – our concern here is only to explain them 
generally, as a common property of cultures – but, conversely, more specific explanations 
are by themselves insufficient to explain the generality of the phenomenon. 
 
3.1. Conceptual ‘Bleeding’ 
The second attribute of culture treated here is the ‘bleeding’ of properties between 
associated concepts. The ‘bleeding’ of properties across distinct but associated (indeed, 
often jointly invoked) concepts is well documented in the anthropological literature, and 
forms the basis of what Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) terms the “science of the concrete.” 
While Levi-Strauss focused on dyadic pairs – such as the Siberian Iakut’s use of a 
woodpecker’s beak to treat a toothache – conceptual bleeding is not limited to them: 
Godfrey Lienhardt (1961) discusses the tendency among the Dinka for clan divinities to 
form “little groups of associated images.” Lienhardt’s first example is worth quoting at 
length because of the large number of associations involved (1961:111): 
The imagery of the divinities of the Pajieng clan is an illustration of this. It may 
be said of this clan, by those who are not members of it and when no members are 
present, that its divinity is Excrement. Pajieng. . .acquired the black cobra as its 
clan-divinity; this is a deadly snake, and the Dinka regard its swift bite as 
inevitably fatal. The black cobra. . .is for this and other reasons specially 
associated with night-witches, who are thought to use its blood and venom to 
injure their victims. The darkness of the cobra and it unexpected and deadly attack 
connect it with the secret nocturnal operations of the most powerful witches the 
Dinka can imagine; and as the cobra sheds and leaves its skin (roc kuac) and 
disappears, to appear anew and claim further victims, so witches are thought to 
renew themselves and return to cause further injury. One of the signs which lead a 
man to suspect witchcraft is to find human excrement in his homestead when he 
wakes in the morning. To excrete in the homestead, as an anti-social act of 
particular unpleasantness, is thought to be a witch’s habit. Hence the total 
constellation of imagery around the black cobra includes human excrement, and 




In the case of another clan, Pajiek, brushes, head carrying rings, and “more widely the 
whole action of sweeping” are all respected because they are made out of wec grass, the 
clan divinity. Lienhardt reports that lions and anthills are divinities of the same clan 
because lions often find shelter in the bushes surrounding anthills. The deleib palm is 
associated with a certain grain because the pestle used to grind the grain is made of deleib 
palm wood. Lienhardt gives further examples, and many more could be recounted from 
the anthropological literature, but we trust that these suffice to identify the kinds of 
associations we have in mind.  
  
It is worth noting at this point that Sperber (1985a) has suggested that data of the 
kind reported by Lienhardt are often interpretive descriptions of fragmentary patterns that 
have been uttered at some point by some informants. Lienhardt, then (in Sperber’s view), 
is effectively conflating several of these patterns in order to reflect what he perceives as 
the inherent systematicity of these representations. While we have reservations about the 
way Lienhardt presents his evidence, we believe that, in this case, the apparent 
systematicity is not simply an interpretive artifact. Sperber’s main example of 
interpretation in ethnography is Evans-Pritchard’s account of sacrifice in Nuer religion. 
Sacrifice, according to Evans-Pritchard, is a form of contract between humans and God. 
Sperber rightly notes that this interpretation of sacrifice is many times removed from 
what Evans-Pritchard could actually observe. Conversely, it is perfectly plausible that 
Dinka readily and explicitly made these associations in speech (though we cannot be 
certain because the accurate reporting of utterances was not Lienhardt’s aim). It is very 
likely that different Dinka would not recognize all of these associations, or would 
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interpret some of them differently; nonetheless, we think that the propensity to make such 
associations is, as we will later argue, simply the outcome of the way memory is 
instantiated in the mind. For now, let us stipulate that at least some of these associations 
are made by at least some people under some circumstances.  
  
The sorts of associations people make are not principled in an obvious and 
transparent way. Some of the associations above could be described loosely as “causal” – 
the connections between excrement and witches, between pestle and grain – but as many 
are coincidental – the blackness of cobra and night, the lion and the anthill – so we do not 
see a particular causal bias in the connections. Rather, associations seem to follow a 
variety of paths, some quite opaque to outsiders, as Lienhardt notes (1961, p. 112). That a 
large number of different kinds of associations can connect concepts in people’s minds is 
also evidenced by a linguistic study by Casagrande and Hale (1967), who found that in 
Papago folk definitions concepts can be linked by 13 different relations, including 
precedence, co-occurrence, source, analogy, and others.  
  
Unlike the cross-domain distinctions discussed above, conceptual bleeding 
focuses on explicitly described and readily verbalized properties of the specific concepts 
involved. In understanding cross-domain distinctions, the ethnographic challenge is to 
discern precisely the unarticulated principle of distinction; the challenge in understanding 
conceptual bleeding is to trace the (usually heterogeneous) connections from one concept 
to another.  
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3.2. Cognitive Source: Semantic Networks 
Our third and final cognitive principle derives from associative theories of semantic 
memory (Smith, 1978). Semantic memory refers to the capacity of humans to acquire and 
use knowledge about the world. It is generally defined in opposition to episodic memory, 
which refers to the capacity to remember previous experiences as experienced (Tulving, 
1985; Tulving, 1995). The vast number of things we hold in our memory, and the speed 
with which they can be retrieved, imply that this knowledge is organized in an efficient 
way. When trying to build a computer model of human information processing, Quillian 
(1968) proposed that semantic memory is organized as a network composed of nodes – 
concepts – and links between the nodes, which represent the properties of the concepts. 
These associative links are weighted; that is, they are more or less strongly activated 
when the corresponding node is activated.18  
 
Two general characteristics of network models are particularly relevant for the 
understanding of conceptual bleeding. The first is known as “spreading activation” 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). This refers to the notion that the activation of a node in the 
network through retrieval (recalling the concept of seagull) also leads to a partial 
activation of connected nodes (bird; fish as food; etc.) However, because the activation of 
connected nodes is only partial, downstream activations fade out over the space of the 
network. 
 
                                                 
18 The best-known implementation of the associative network approach is known as the hierarchical 
network model , but the specifics of this version (and their criticism) are not relevant for our claims. 
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The second relevant characteristic is known as the developmental perspective. 
This simply posits that strength of association (and therefore ease of activation, and 
ultimately of recall) is proportional to degree of exposure. The connection between the 
‘my birthday’ network node and my date of birth is very strong, because it has been 
activated thousands of times. That between ‘my grandfather’s birthday’ and his date of 
birth has been activated many fewer times, and so it would take me longer to state my 
grandfather’s birth date than my own.  
  
Three decades of psychological research has provided a great deal of evidence for 
the network organization of semantic memory. To take just one classic example, Meyer 
and Schvaneveldt (1976; Meyer, Schvaneveldt, & Ruddy, 1972) found that semantic 
priming aids performance in a lexical decision task. Lexical decision tasks are simple 
experiments in which participants are given a stimulus – a string of letters – and asked to 
decide whether it forms a word or not. Meyer and colleagues used stimulus pairs, 
composed of either two words, two nonwords, or one of each; in the two-word pairs, they 
used both semantically related (bread, butter) and non related items (bread, engine). 
Participants had to make lexical decision about each element of the pair in turn. These 
decisions were faster if a stimulus word was preceded by a semantically related stimulus 
word. Speed of response can be used as a metric for closeness of association, which 
makes it possible to map the network with some precision.  
 
How far can evidence obtained in laboratory studies speak to the anthropological 
problem of conceptual ‘bleeding?’ While anthropologists rightly criticize the ease with 
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which some psychologists extrapolate from small samples to the whole of world cultures, 
there is a vast amount of real-world evidence that converges with the experimental 
evidence for the semantic network organization model of memory. 
 
First, associative theories of semantic memory can account for the developmental 
process of cultural learning observable in all human societies. In particular, the model 
helps explain problems associated with adult cultural learning. While children acquire 
their native culture effortlessly, learning (as an immigrant, a refugee, or an 
anthropologist) the structuring principles of a new culture after having been raised in 
another is a strenuous task that entails the meticulous dismantling and rebuilding of 
semantic networks. For example, the association between cobras and witches found 
among the Dinka would not be familiar or intuitive to most people who have been raised 
outside Dinka society. The classic memory studies by Bartlett (1932) showed that when 
English participants struggled to remember the unfamiliar features of a Kwakiutl tale 
(originally collected by Franz Boas), they filled in what they perceived as holes in the 
narrative with their own culturally-derived expectations. 
 
Secondly, the semantic network organization of human memory predicts that it 
will perform best when dealing with specific sorts of input. As we argued in the 
introduction, most common cultural products exploit the most efficient aspects of the 
memory system. For example, content-rich myths that do not rely on verbatim narration 
are very widespread in oral cultures, even though there is no intrinsic reason for their 
popularity. Naturally, the opposite also holds: cultural items that run afoul of the same 
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formal constraints – specifically, in failing to exploit the network-like structure of 
semantic memory – will be less likely to be remembered, and therefore to be transmitted 
from one person to the next.19 Bateson (1958 [1936]), for example, estimates that learned 
Iatmul men can remember between ten and twenty thousand names. However, he argues 
that rote memory plays a negligible role in the process of remembering (1958 
[1936]:222f.): 
The names which are remembered are almost all of them compounds, each 
containing from four to six syllables, and they refer to details of esoteric 
mythology, so that each name has at least a leaven of meaning. The names are 
arranged in pairs, and the names in any one pair generally resemble each other 
much as the word Tweedledum resembles the word Tweedledee—with the 
notable difference that the altered syllable or syllables generally have some 
meaning and are connected together by some simple type of association, e.g. 
either by contrast or by synonymy. A progressive alteration of meaning may run 
through a series of pairs.  
 
Let us now reconsider the cross-culturally recurrent phenomenon of conceptual bleeding 
in the light of the above considerations. 
 
Figure 6.1. A representation of Dinka associations between concepts. Properties of concepts are 
italicized; properties that are presumed to exist, but for which there is no direct evidence are 
                                                 
19 Although exceptions do occur – witness the importance of accurate genealogical recitation in many 
societies – they are characteristically 1) of fundamental cultural significance, and 2) their handling is 
restricted to a specialized sector of society (who can presumably devote time and resources to this special 
kind of learning). 
Property 11 





Shared property set: 
Fatal, uses venom, attacks in 
the dark, renews itself 
Excretes in 
homestead 
Property 2n  Property 21 Property 1n 
Flow of association
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connected to concepts by dotted arrows. The path of association described by Lienhardt is 
depicted by a dashed line. 
 
Because of the organization of human memory, properties shared by two concepts 
become activated when either concept is recalled; and when a concept is recalled, the 
activation spreads from it to other concepts through the properties they have in common, 
progressively losing power. Thus in the Dinka example the cobra and the night-witch are 
both dangerous, use venom to injure their victims, and are able to renew themselves. The 
large number of shared properties makes it likely that invoking the image of a cobra will 
prime that of a witch in people’s minds – and vice versa. The enhanced ease of activation 
is in turn responsible for the increased likelihood that both concepts will be recalled and 
produced at the same time, and that the association will be recognized by others who 
possess the same kind of network structure.  
 
Conclusions 
At the outset of this paper, we undertook to show that some organizational features of 
culture could be fruitfully described and explained in terms of operating principles of the 
human mind. Arguments about the relation between culture and mind tend either to see 
culture as mind writ large or to see mind as culture writ small. Whether as a matter of 
disciplinary priority (“We have the real action”) or familiarity and comfort, 
anthropologists and psychologists have tended to minimize each other’s purview and to 
make extravagant claims about their own. But this is nonsense: culture and mind cannot 
be reduced to each other, either at present or in the foreseeable future. 
 
The kind of theorizing we engage here focuses on the interaction between 
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dynamic cognitive processes and larger social and ecological processes. It differs from 
preceding kinds of inquiries in its dynamism: whereas most other work on culture and 
cognition holds one term fixed and examines its influence on the other, we focus on the 
interaction between cognitive and social processes. Harvey Whitehouse’s theory of 
modes of religiosity (2004) is the best developed theory along these lines, delineating 
broad patterns in religiosity that result from the interaction of memory and social 
structure. Malley’s (2004) ethnography of evangelicals’ Bible use also emphasizes the 
interaction between social and cognitive processes in an institutional context. 
 
We have tried here to show how a few kinds of cultural patterns may be identified 
with a few cognitive processes. But in making this identification we do not dispose of 
either. The cultural patterns that ethnographers have observed among the Dinka and the 
Trobrianders and the Maring are not straightforward manifestations of individual thought, 
but are the product of minds in interaction with each other and their environment, in a 
historical context. This is why we have spoken of kinds of cultural order: a kind of 
cultural order can be identified with a cognitive process, but the specific ideational 
structure that emerges could not have been predicted from cognition alone. Conversely, 
the cognitive processes we have described are manifest also in many non-cultural forms, 
and general cognitive processes cannot be derived from the kinds of specific inputs that 
ethnographers have identified. 
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The preceding papers share a number of themes; the first three show in different ways 
how the social environment in which people are raised interacts with their evolved and 
developing mind to create culturally variable cognitions. Chapters V and VI instead 
outline some of the ways in which anthropologists have failed to accurately characterize 
the psychology of the people they study.  
 
The two papers on belief attribution in Yukatek children confirm that this is a 
cross-culturally early-emerging capacity; at the same time, they underscore the crucial 
role played by culture. Humans in every society attribute knowledge to others. Why they 
should do so is clear – being able to predict what others will do and to generate a viable 
hypothesis that can account for why they are doing it places one at a distinct advantage in 
terms of co-operation, and the capacity to co-operate is, after all, one of the foundations 
of human (and more generally animal) sociality (Hamilton, 1964; Stevens & Hauser, 
2004; Wilkinson, 1984). But beyond this general adaptive capacity, the social 
environment in which children are raised was shown to affect how children attribute 
knowledge to others. As they grow, Yukatek children become exposed to testimony about 
super-natural entities from their parents, elders, and peers. They process this testimony 
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and use their knowledge to determine whether the Catholic God or a number of local 
religious entities are sufficiently unlike humans to have different psychological traits. 
Such a task appears simple at first glance, but it should be remembered that, at least in 
some contemporary formulations, cross-culturally recurrent cognitive processes, such as 
belief attribution, are thought to be strongly modular in Fodor’s sense, and thus unable or 
unlikely to access encyclopaedic knowledge. In contrast, the picture of cognition that 
emerges from these studies is of a specialized mechanism with significant scope for 
cultural variability. 
  
 Although only a few years ago the effect of culture on cognition was a minority 
interest, it has now become a well-established topic in psychology (see e.g. Nisbett, 2003; 
Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Norenzayan & 
Nisbett, 2000; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Even psychologists who have 
no interest in studying culture now have no misgivings in admitting that it can influence 
the most basic processes. 
 Predictably, after an initial period in which macro-differences (at the level of 
nations and culture areas) were the principal focus of research for cross-cultural 
psychologists, attention is now shifting to differences between groups that are more 
closely related to each other. Although effect sizes predictably weaken as one chooses 
ever smaller and more similar units of analysis, it is remarkable that measurable 
differences may be found inside single countries, or even within a region of a country. 
 Chapter IV argued that historical processes can shape the structure of familial and 
extra-familial social relations; this, in turn, is thought to affect performance on a simple 
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categorization task. The difference found between northern and southern Italians can be 
explained in terms of centuries of divergent social processes, which can be linked both to 
historical accident and to ecological conditions. The difference between SES-based 
groups can also be explained in similar terms, but the fact that the effect is only found in 
the Southern sample requires further investigation. It is possible that the less pronounced 
economic inequality found in northern Italy acts as a restraint to the cultural 
differentiation of class-based groups. In other words, it is possible that low-SES sectors 
of society only become measurably more interdependent than the wealthier members of 
their society when they are seriously marginalized. This study is just the first step in 
understanding the effects of sub-national and sub-cultural effects on basic cognitive tasks. 
 
 Chapter V revisits the topic of the attribution of knowledge, this time from the 
perspective of the professional anthropologist. It is meant as a further illustration of the 
idea that mindreading is a universal capacity – used even by academics – but also as a 
warning against the unreflective application of our innate tendencies when thinking 
scientifically. The problems of ascription are many, but I think that the most insidious are 
those of which people are unaware. The ascription of beliefs to individuals runs into 
particularly serious difficulties when we deal with incompatible representations –
contradictory beliefs held by the same individual and deployed in different contexts. This 




Chapter VI argues that three organizational features of culture observed by 
anthropologists – its systematicity; the recurrence of distinctions across semantic, 
conceptual, and practical boundaries; and the ‘bleeding’ of properties between associated 
concepts – may find their origin in fundamental operating principles of the human mind – 
respectively, the cognitive principle of relevance, the decompositionality of cognitive 
processing, and the network structure of semantic memory. The reframing of some 
features of culture in cognitive terms may open up some ethnographic observations, so 
far resistant to anthropological explanation, to new avenues for theory and relevant data 
from other disciplines. In the Introduction, I commented on the lack of a coherent and 
widely shared epistemological framework in anthropology, and pointed out that in some 
cases it resulted in the creation of non-cumulative knowledge – or, as Geertz put it, of 
new theory that does not speak to previous hypotheses. The fact that some important 
properties of culture have been identified by several anthropologists and that they have 
been left unexplained, as mere observations, is a direct consequence of this approach, and 
this paper goes some way towards improving that situation.  
 
To conclude, I would like to return to a point I made in the Introduction about the 
challenges of interdisciplinarity. I argued that anthropologists who accept the 
epistemological strictures of psychology have to invest a significant amount of their time 
and resources in re-training. In a certain sense, it is easier for a psychologist to accept that 
culture matters – for example, that cultural groups may differ significantly on a number 
of basic psychological measures that were until that point thought to be culture-
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independent. The epistemological commitment on their side is often small or non-
existent. Yet they too have to struggle to think in a new way.  
The last decade has seen a multiplication of institutional efforts to minimize such 
struggles and to expand the field of culture and cognition. One example of such efforts is 
the establishment of the Culture & Cognition program at the University of Michigan. I 
am privileged to be among the first to have been able to train interdisciplinarily from the 
beginning of my academic career. I should like to think that the topical breadth of the 
previous papers, as well as their essential methodological and epistemological unity, are 
not atypical of current directions in culture and cognition. I hope this works serves to 
illustrate that, in spite of the efforts involved, anthropologists and psychologists have 
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